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This paper presents an “audit” of the multistage application and appeal process that the U.S. Social
Security Administration (SSA) uses to determine eligibility for disability benefits from the Disability
Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs. We study a subset of individuals
from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) who applied for DI or SSI benefits between 1992 and
1996. We compare the SSA's ultimate award decision (i.e. after allowing for appeals) to the
applicant's self-reported disability status. We use these data to estimate classification error rates
under the hypothesis that applicants' self-reported disability status and the SSA's ultimate award
decision are noisy but unbiased indicators of, a latent “true disability status” indicator. We find that
approximately 20\% of SSI/DI applicants who are ultimately awarded benefits are not disabled, and
that 60\% of applicants who were denied benefits are disabled. Our analysis also yields insights into
the patterns of self-selection induced by varying delays and award probabilities at various levels of
the application and appeal process. We construct an optimal statistical screening rule using a subset
of objective health indicators that the SSA uses in making award decisions that results in
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This paper provides an audit of the multistage application and appeal process that the U.S. Social Security
Administration (SSA) uses to determine eligibility for disability benets under the Disability Insurance (DI)
and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs.1 We seek to quantify the magnitude of classication
errors in the award process, that is, what fraction of applicants who are awarded benets are not really
disabled, and what fraction of applicants who are denied benets are really disabled? This is a difcult
task since it would appear to require an objective denition of true disability as well as an independent,
veriable procedure for reviewing SSA's award decisions to determine which applicants are truly disabled.
Ever since the inception of the DI program in 1956 and the subsequent introduction of SSI in 1974, SSA
has made disability determinations according to the same basic denition of disability, namely
The inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity (SGA) by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment, which can be expected to result in death, or which
has lasted, or can be expected to last, for a continuous period of at least 12 months.2
While this appears to be a reasonably objective denition of disability, in practice it is very difcult to
determine whether or not a particular individual is capable of substantial gainful activity. For example,
there are hundreds of objectively veriable medical conditions, cataloged in the SSA's Blue Book, that are
regarded assufciently severe toautomatically qualify an applicant for benets without further consideration
of their residual functional capacity, or the possibility of accommodations that could enable the person
to continue working in their current job or some other less demanding jobs. Examples of these listing
conditions include blindness, multiple sclerosis, and AMS. However, it is easy to cite examples of people
who suffer from these conditions who can, and indeed do, work.3 Thus, even the most obvious objectively
veriable disabling conditions do not seem to admit any objective, error-free procedure that determines
whether specic individuals suffering from these conditions are capable of working. There appears to be
intangible, difcult to measure characteristics such as intelligence, motivation, and determination that enable
certain people to work in spite of severe handicaps.
In addition to the inherent difculties in making disability determinations on a case by case basis, an
analysis of time series and state level data on SSA disability award rates makes it hard to escape the conclu-
1 Although the DI and SSI programs serve different target populations both programs use the same disability determination
process and the same underlying denition of disability. SSI is a means-tested social assistance program that pays a at benet,
whereas DI is an insurance program for workers that pays benets related to average earnings.
2 DIrecipients can work without lossof benets provided that theirearnings do notexceed a limitknown as theSGAthreshold.
During the period of our study (1992-1996) the SGA threshold was $500 per month. This amount was increased to $800 on January
1, 2003, and will increase in the future to keep up with the national average wage index.
3 Examples include economists Roberto Serrano, Walter Oi, and Curtis Taylor (who are blind) and physicist Stephen Hawking
(who has AMS).
1sion that the implementation of its denition of disability is subject to political and social inuences that can
cause disability award rates to vary widely over time, and across states at a given point in time. For example,
aggregate disability award rates (the fraction of awards in a year divided by the number of applications in
that year) have ranged from a low of 29% in 1982 under the Reagan Administration to a high of 52% in
1998 under the Clinton Administration. It is unlikely that these wide swings in acceptance rates are due to
changes in the characteristics of the applicant pool.
Initial disability determinations, made by state-level bureaucracies known as Disability Determination
Services (DDS), also vary widely across states at a given point in time, again in a manner that is difcult to
ascribe entirely to differences in the characteristics of the applicant pool. For example, in 2000, DDS award
rates for DI applicants ranged from a high of 65% in New Hampshire to a low of 31% in Texas, and award
rates for SSI applicants ranged from a high of 59% in New Hampshire to a low of 27% in West Virginia.4
The variability in the implementation of the SSA's basic denition of disability over time and across
states creates additional difculties for our evaluation of the accuracy of the award process. We do not want
our analysis to be clouded by subjective political judgments about whether the SSA's standards for awarding
disability benets are too lenient or too tough at a particular point in time. Fortunately, it is possible to
separate the question of the accuracy of the disability award process from the question of its leniency under
whatever socio-political regime is in place at a particular point in time.
Our approach for estimating the classication errors in the SSA disability award process is simple: we
compare the SSA's award decisions to the self-reported disability status of a sample of applicants who,
we believe, have provided truthful and accurate reports of their disability status. We study a subset of
individuals from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) who applied for DI or SSI benets between 1992
and 1996. We compare the SSA's ultimate award decision  a (i.e., after allowing for the possibility of appeal)
to the individual's self-reported disability status  d (recorded at the closest HRS interview to the time of
application).5 The latter is a binary indicator that is set to 1 if the HRS respondent reports that they have
an impairment or health condition that prevents them from working entirely, and 0 otherwise. This is
essentially the same as the SSA's denition of disability as an inability to engage in substantial gainful
activity. Although there are semantic differences between the SSA's denition of disability and the
4 The effect of political inuences on disability determinations is clearly evident in the SSA's treatment of alcoholism and drug
addiction. Prior to 1996 these conditions were considered as valid impairments that could enable applicants to qualify for DI or
SSI benets. However, in 1996, the law was amended to specically exclude drug and alcohol addiction as disabling conditions,
leading to a sudden one time surge in recovery rates. This policy change was likely due in part to political pressure arising from
press expos´ es of disability beneciaries who were drug addicts and who admitted to using their disability benets to pay rent and
engaging in larceny to support their drug habit. The policy change may also have been prompted by the welfare reform movement
and the prevalent attitude that able bodied people ought to work.
5 The only exception is for people who applied right after an interview at which they had reported not being disabled. In that
case we assigned the data provided at the subsequent interview, even if this was relatively long after the application date.
2denition implicit in our use of the self-reported disability question in the HRS interviews, we believe that
the denitional differences are of second order relative to the potentially more serious concern that DI or
SSI applicants have an incentive to misreport (i.e., exaggerate) the severity of their impairments and to claim
that they are incapable of working even when they really can work.6
We estimate the classication error rates as follows. In addition to an individual's self-reported disability
status  d and SSA's ultimate award decision  a, assume there exists a third, latent indicator of true disability
status  t. Consider rst the case where  d =  t (i.e., where we treat  d as representing our measure of true
disability). Using observations on the SSA's ultimate award decision  a and the self-reported disability  d
for our sample of applicants from the HRS, we can estimate the joint distribution, Prf a;  dg. The estimated
classication error rates can be computed as conditional probability statements using this joint distribution.
There are two types of classication errors award errors and rejection errors. The former is the conditional
probability that a person who has been awarded benets is not truly disabled, i.e., Prf  d = 0j a = 1g. The
latter error is the conditional probability that an applicant who was denied benets is truly disabled, i.e.,
Prf  d = 1j a = 0g. We estimate the award error to be 22% and the rejection error to be 58%.7
It is possible to estimate the award and rejection error rates without assuming that  d =  t, in the more
realistic case where  a and  d are both noisy indicators of the latent indicator of true disability,  t. Based on
previous empirical work (to be described in section 4), we argue that both  a and  d are unbiased indicators
of true disability status  t. Under the additional assumption that the three binary random variables  t,  d,
and  a form a trivariate probit system with a correlation structure that matches the correlation between the
observed random variables  a and  d, we can derive formulas for the classication error probabilities by a
straightforward application of Bayes Rule. Our Bayes estimates of the award error rate is 21.7%, and the
rejection error rate is 59.9%, which hardly differ from the award and rejection errors, 21.9% and 58.6%
6 The HRS denition of disability as a health condition that prevents a person from working entirely is stricter in some
respects than the SSA's denition of disability. Under the SSA's denition a person could be considered disabled even if they were
still able to work, provided that their monthly earnings did not exceed the SGA threshold. However, there are other respects in
which the HRS denition of disability is less strict than the SSA denition. A respondent in the HRS may report that they are
unable to work entirely, but due to a temporary health problem that is not expected to last continuously for 12 months or end in
death. These individuals would not be eligible for benets according the SSA's denition. Also it is not clear whether an HRS
respondent who reports that their health condition prevents them from working entirely is referring to their current job or any job.
Under the SSA's denition a person is disabled only if they are unable to engage in substantial gainful activity in any type of job,
even if this might involve retraining or relocation. A nal source of differences between  a and  d may be due to differences in
timing between when the award decision was ultimately made and when the individual was interviewed by the HRS. When the
self-reported disability is taken from the wave of the HRS after the person reported applying for disability benets it is possible
that they could have recovered from their disability since the date they applied. While the timing difference and the differences in
denition can be a source of some discrepancies between  a and  d, we believe they have only second-order effects and cannot be
responsible for the very large discrepancies that we nd in this analysis.
7 The award and rejection errors are different from the usual Type I and Type II errors of hypothesis testing. A Type I error rate
is the probability of rejecting H0, that an applicant is truly disabled, when it is true, i.e., Prf a = 0j t = 1g, while Type II error rate
is the probability of not rejecting H0 when it is false, i.e., Prf a = 1j t = 0g. Our point estimates of the Type I and II error rates of
the SSA award process are 22% and 62%, respectively.
3respectively, obtained in the case where we assume that  d =  t with probability 1.
Our Bayes estimates are based on an equicorrelation assumption that implies that  a and  d are equally
accurate signals of true disability status  t. However, in order to assess the robustness of our conclusions
we also compute classication error rates under the assumption that unobservable factors affect the Social
Security award decision  a are much more highly correlated with the unobservable factors affecting true
disability status  t, than are the unobservable factors affecting individuals' self-reported disability status  d.
This implies that the Social Security award decision  ais a signicantly more accurate signal of true disability
than is an individual's self-report  d. However, even in this case the classication error rates are substantial,
and in our best case (for SSA) results, the award error rate is 16% and the rejection error rate is 52%.
We propose an alternative disability determination procedure based on an optimal statistical screening
rule that awards disability benets when the predicted probability that an applicant is truly disabled is suf-
ciently high. We show that this statistical screening rule results in signicantly fewer classication errors
than the multi-stage system currently used by the SSA. This suggests that there may be cheaper, faster, and
more accurate ways of making disability determinations than the SSA's current award process. The SSA
has considered similar types of statistical screening rules as part of a disability process redesign initiative
introduced under the Clinton administration, but its current status is unclear. The SSA has recently imple-
mented a more limited set of changes in the award process that may facilitate the transition to statistical
screening rules as a replacement for initial determination decisions by the state level DDSs.
Section 2 reviews estimates of classication error rates from previous studies, including SSA's own
internal audits of its disability award process. Section 3 describes the DI and SSI programs and the disability
award process. Section 4 provides empirical evidence that survey respondents who are given strong, credible
assurances of condentiality provide truthful, unbiased, and accurate reports of their disability status.
The accuracy of self-reports are critical to our ability to evaluate the classication errors of the disability
award process. Section 5 describes the HRS data used in this analysis and demonstrates that the self-
reported disability  d constitutes an approximate sufcient statistic that better predicts variation in a list of
objective health indicators than does the SSA's ultimate award decision  a. Section 6 presents our Bayesian
analysis of the classication errors in the disability award process. Section 7 analyzes the sources of these
classication errors at different stages of the disability award and appeal process. Section 8 describes a
computerized disability screening procedure that outperforms the multi-stage system currently used at SSA.
Section 9 summarizes various disability redesign initiatives that SSA has considered over the past decade,
including the use of statistical screening rules similar to the one proposed in section 8. Section 10 offers
some conclusions and qualications of our research ndings, and suggestions for further research.
42 Previous Estimates of SSDI Classication Error Rates
Our estimated classication error rates are higher than those estimated in previous internal and external
audits of the SSA's disability award process. Some of these studies relied on decisions of independent
experts who attempted to directly measure true disability status  t. Smith and Lilienfeld (1971) reported
the results of an internal audit of DI awards done by the SSA's own Bureau of Disability Insurance (BDI).
The BDI found that 21.2% of DI awards should have been denied and 22.5% of DI denials should have been
awarded. However, the objectivity of SSA's self-audits may be open to question.
In a seminal study, Nagi (1969) provided an independent external audit of a sample of 2,454 DI cases.
Teams of ve experts (consisting of a physician, psychologist, social worker, occupational therapist, and a
vocational counselor) conducted individual home examinations/interviews for their sample of DI applicants.
With the assistance of a moderator, the team arrived at a collective decision about the disability status of
the applicant, without knowledge of the SSA's actual award decision. The results, summarized in Table 1
below, are qualitatively similar to our ndings. In particular, the implied rejection error rate, 48%, was
almost three times as large as the award error rate, 19%. The team of experts was slightly more lenient than
SSA, concluding that 68% of applicants were disabled compared to the SSA's award rate of 62%. However,
this difference is not large enough to explain the surprising number of classication errors. Overall, the
expert team's decisions differed from SSA's award decision in over 30% of the cases considered.
Table 1: Summary of DI Classication Errors from Nagi (1969)
Expert SSA Award Decision Total
Team Decision Awarded Denied
Can Work 291 492 783
(19.3%) (52.1%) (31.9%)
Cannot Work 1,219 452 1,671
(80.7%) (47.9%) (68.1%)
Total 1,510 944 2,454
(61.5%) (38.5%) (100.0%)
Unfortunately, to our knowledge, there are no recent studies undertaking a similar assessment of the
classication errors in the current DI award process. The rapid growth during the mid-1990s in the number
of initial DI denials overturned on appeal could be an indication of a rise in the classication error rates over
this period. One likely reason for this is the unprecedented and unsustainable growth rate (over 10% per
5year) of awards during the early part of the 1990s, overwhelming the processing capacity of the DDSs. The
increase in applications also led to substantial growth in the number of appeals to the SSA's Administrative
Law Judges (ALJs). The total number of appeals grew from 225,000 in 1986 to about 498,000 in 1996 (U.S.
GAO 1997), increasing processing delays and creating a backlog of nearly a half million cases. The GAO
study reports that the average processing time for appealed cases rose from about 10 months in 1994 to
over one year in 1996. These huge backlogs have naturally led to concern about the quality of evaluations,
especially in view of the high reversal rate (of initial denials by the DDS centers) by ALJs, as is clear from
the summary provided in Table 2. Most importantly, note that this pattern is apparent across all impairment
types. The overall award rate of the ALJs, 77%, is more than twice as large as the 30% initial award rate at
the DDS level.
Table 2: Summary of DDS and ALJ Award Rates by Impairment Type
Condition DDS Award Rate ALJ Award Rate
Physical 29% 74%
Musculoskeletal 16 75
Back cases 11 75
Other 23 76




All impairments 30 77
The GAO report specically cites incomplete documentation of the DDS centers as one of the main
reasons for denial of benets, and one of the major factors behind the high reversal rate by the ALJs.8
However, the report also suggested that some reversals may be due to the limited medical expertise of the
ALJs, who are judges not doctors, and who consult independent medical experts in only 8% of cases leading
to awards. In 1997, 27% of all awards were due to successful appeals to ALJs. The GAO report documents
major inconsistencies between initial disability determinations by the DDS and the ultimate decisions by the
ALJs. Nevertheless, this report provides no explicit information on whether the appeal option increases or
reduces the award and rejection errors.
8 Specically, the GAO states that: In a 1994 study, SSA found that written explanations of critical issues at the DDS level
were inadequate in about half of the appeal cases that turned on complex issues. Without a clear explanation of the DDS decision,
the ALJ could neither effectively consider it, nor give it much weight (U.S. GAO 1997, p. 8).
63 The Social Security Disability Award Process
The Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security Income Disability Insurance (SSI)
account for increasingly large components of social insurance spending in the U.S. The programs provided
benets to nearly 12 million individuals in 2001, at a cost of $55 billion for DI, and $32 billion for SSI.9
Although DI and SSI have the same total number of beneciaries, 6.7 million, the DI program is nearly
twice as expensive due to the fact that the average monthly DI benet, $786, is twice as large as the average
monthly SSI benet, $385. Overall, these programs constitute approximately one-fth of the SSA's total
annual expenditures, and 75% of its administrative budget, 5% of the Federal Budget, and nearly 1% of U.S.
GDP.
The volume of applications combined with the complexities involved in screening and adjudicating ap-
plications and appeals makes administration of these programs expensive and time consuming. For example,
in 1998, the SSA processed more than two million applications for DI and SSI benets, and over 500,000
appeals, at a cost of over four billion dollars, more than 67% of the SSA's total administrative costs. There
is a large bureaucracy involved in making disability determinations, including over 15,000 employees at
the SSA's 54 DDS centers and over 1,000 Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) who handle the rst stage of
appeal beyond reconsiderations by the DDSs. The average cost of running this bureaucracy is about $2,000
per application. However, SSA may have ample justication for running this expensive and complicated
monitoring technology. According to the Social Security Advisory Board (1998, p.1): It is estimated
that a young, average-earning disabled worker and his family will receive about $285,000 over the course
of their lifetime. ::: nearly one out of three young men and nearly one out of four young women who are
now age 20 will become disabled before reaching age 67.
The process by which SSA makes disability determinations starts when an applicant les an initial
application for DI benets at one of the SSA's 1,300 eld ofces. This application is forwarded to one of the
54 DDS centers for processing, usually in the state where the claimant resides. The DDS makes an initial
or rst-stage award decision according to a sequential ve-stage screening procedure illustrated in Lahiri
et al. (1995), which we reproduce in Figure 1. This procedure is designed to weed out inappropriate cases
quickly, so that resources can be devoted to judging difcult cases where the determination of physical or
9 DI was enacted in 1956 to insure covered workers, their spouses, and dependents against loss of earnings due to disability,
under the strict denition of disability given in the introduction. Workers over the age of 31 are disability-insured if they had
20 quarters of coverage during the last 40 quarters and are fully insured. They are fully insured if they had at least one quarter of
coverage for each year between 1950 (or age 21, if later) and the year they reached age 62 (or became disabled, if earlier). SSI was
enacted in 1974 in part to cover gaps in coverage to people such as housewives, divorcees, and others who do not have sufcient
work history to be covered under DI. The SSI program is more akin to welfare: it is mean-tested, and average monthly benets are
only about 50% as high as DI benets. See Ben´ tez-Silva et al. (1999), Apfel (1999), Bound and Burkhauser (1999), Haveman and
Wolfe (2000), and the Social Security Advisory Board (1998) for more detailed information about these programs.
7psychological problems is less clear-cut. In 2001, the mean time for an initial decision by the DDS was
about 90 days. Each of the ve stages is handled by separate specialists, and this is the reason why a large
number of different people are typically involved in the DDS's award decision for a single applicant.
Figure 1: Five Stage DDS Disability Determination Procedure
In the rst stage, the DDS determines whether or not the applicant has engaged in substantial gainful
activity (SGA) subsequent to the claimed date of onset of disability. Any applicant who is found to earn
in excess of the SGA threshold has demonstrated an ability to engage in SGA and is denied benets at this
stage. At the second stage, the severity of the physical or psychological problem is assessed. Applicants
are denied if the impairment is not expected to last longer than 12 months or end in death. The third
stage consists of a determination of whether the applicant's impairment is one of several hundred severe
impairments, in the Listing of Impairments in SSA's Blue Book. If the applicant's impairment appears
in this list, then the applicant is automatically granted a Medical Allowance. Applicants who are denied a
Medical Allowance are referred to the fourth stage, at which the DDS evaluates residual functional capacity,
in order to determine whether or not the disability prevents the individual from being engaged in any element
of his/her previous work. If this is found not to be the case, the applicant is denied benets. Otherwise, the
8application is passed on to the fth and nal stage where the DDS evaluates the applicant's capacity for
other work. Applicants deemed capable of engaging in another type of SGA receive a Vocational Denial,
while those found unable to do so receive a Vocational Allowance.
Applicants who are awarded benets cannot begin receiving their benets until the end of a ve-month
waiting period.10 DI beneciaries are entitled to Medicare coverage two years after the date of successful
application, even if they are younger than 65, the normal eligibility age for Medicare coverage of Old Age
insurance beneciaries. The current average disability benet is around $786 per month, approximately the
same as the poverty line in the U.S.
An applicant can appeal an initial rejection. There are four different appeal stages, illustrated in Figure 2.
The rst level of appeal is known as Reconsideration and is performed by the same DDSthat made the initial
determination. An application for reconsideration must be led within 60 days of receipt of an initial denial
notice. According to Social Security, 50% of denied applicants request a reconsideration, and the mean time
required by the DDS to reach a decision on an SSDI reconsideration was 69 days. The acceptance rate at the
reconsideration stage is 16%, lower than the 38% acceptance rate for initial determinations. An applicant
who is denied benets at the reconsideration stage has 60 days to exercise the option to appeal to an ALJ.
According to Social Security, approximately 86% of applicants who were denied at the reconsideration
stage decided to appeal to an ALJ. In 2001, the mean time for a decision from an ALJ was 308 days, and
the acceptance rate at this stage increases to 59%. An applicant who was denied benets by the ALJ has
60 days to le a request for consideration at the central Appeals Board in Washington. According to Social
Security, the Appeals Board considers about 40% of all ALJ dispositions, including cases it reviews on its
own initiative. The mean duration for a decision from the Appeals Board is 447 days and the award rate is
only 2%. An additional 22% of the cases heard by the Appeals Board are remanded back to the ALJ. After
this stage the only remaining recourse is an appeal to Federal Court. These appeals involve average delays
in excess of 18 months, substantial legal fees, and an acceptance rate of only 6%. It is also worth noting that
48% of the appeals to the Federal Court are remanded back to the ALJ level.
The other Federal program providing disability benets is the SSI, a means-tested cash assistance pro-
gram enacted in 1974. Unlike the DI, there is no work requirement for SSI benets. However, SSI ap-
plications are evaluated according to the same process as DI benets and satisfy the same basic denition
of disability. Furthermore, SSI is mean-tested with very low earnings and asset thresholds of $545 per
month and $2,000, respectively, for a single individual.11 As a result of different eligibility requirements,
10 The start of waiting period is the later of (a) the date of disability onset; and (b) the date the applicant rst attained disability
insured status. It is waived if the applicant had a period of disability in the ve years prior to the onset of the current disability.
11 The asset threshold excludes home, auto, household items, burial plots, and life insurance with face value under $1,500.
9the SSI program serves a different clientele than does the SSDI program: 55% of disabled adults under
65 receiving SSI benets are women, whereas 58% of adult SSDI beneciaries are male. In contrast to DI,
SSI recipients are not subject to the ve-month waiting period and are immediately eligible for Medicaid
benets. However, monthly SSI benets are signicantly lower, averaging only $385 per month in 2001.
Stapleton et al. (1994) show that since the late 1980s, the trends in applications, awards, and acceptance
rates for the SSI and DI programs have been very similar. This is fortunate from our perspective, because
the HRS data do not allow us to distinguish between the two programs.
Figure 2: Summary of SSA's Disability Application and Appeal Process
4 Do People Truthfully Report Their Disability Status?
Our analysis of classication errors in the SSA's award process depends critically on the use of self-reported
disability status. The credibility of our conclusions depend on the assumption that individuals' self-reports
10are truthful and accurate. This section provides evidence supporting this hypothesis.
There is a large academic literature that questions the validity of self-reported disability as a measure of
true disability due to the presumed incentive to misrepresent one's health status in order to rationalize
non-participation in the labor force (for survey respondents), or to increase the odds of being awarded
benets (for DI or SSI applicants). While we agree that the SSI and DI applicants have an incentive to
misrepresent their health status to the SSA, we believe that due to strong guarantees of condentiality, HRS
survey respondents had no incentive to misrepresent their health or disability status, and provided truthful
answers to these questions. The HRS survey was conducted by the University of Michigan Survey Research
Center (SRC) and not by SSA, and respondents were given strong assurances that their identities would not
be revealed.12
One piece of evidence supporting our truthful reporting hypothesis is the fact that among HRS respon-
dents who reported receiving DI and SSI benets (in the income section of the HRS survey), 18% reported
that their health condition did not prevent them from working entirely (in the disability section of the sur-
vey). It is hard to reconcile these responses with the prevailing view that respondents exaggerate health
problems in order to rationalize labor force non-participation or receipt of disability benets. It seems more
likely that the DIand SSIrecipients felt no stigma in admitting that their health problem did not prevent them
from working, and that they believed the HRS's guarantees of anonymity and condentiality were credible.
Otherwise it would not make sense for a DI or SSI recipient to make such admissions, especially if they
believed their responses could be detected by the SSA (based on a linkage of their survey ID to their social
security number), since these reports would presumably be grounds for the SSA to order audits, known as
continuing disability reviews (CDRs), to remove them from the rolls.13
The validity of our analysis also depends on an additional assumption, which we refer to as the accurate
reporting hypothesis. Even if individuals truthfully report whether they are capable of working or not,
12 In the second wave of the HRS respondents were asked for permission to link their survey responses to specic types of
administrative data held by the SSA, including earnings histories from the SSA and a limited amount of beneciary data. However,
they were given legally binding guarantees that the linkage would occur only for these data items and that SSA would not retain any
information that would make it possible to link their survey ID to their Social Security number or take any action that would in any
way jeopardize their Social Security benets. Based on these strong guarantees, over 9,000 of the original 12,652 HRS respondents
contacted by the HRS in wave 1 agreed to allow these administrative data linkages to be made.
13 Although it is possible that some of these 18% had experienced a medical recovery, in fact fewer than 1% of all DI beneciaries
ever leave therolls voluntarily asa result ofmedical recoveries despite strong incentives such as a 9month trialwork period during
which beneciaries are allowed to work without fear of being removed from the rolls or losing any benets (Muller 1992). It is a
puzzle why so few DI recipients voluntarily return to work if a signicant fraction of them have either recovered or were never truly
disabled in the rst place. However, we show in Section 6 below that most DI recipients are very poor with much lower educational
attainment compared to non-recipients. The after-tax wages that recipients could expect to earn from returning to work may not be
substantially higher than their DI or SSI benets, and they would also lose their access to Medicare or Medicaid coverage if they
were to leave the rolls. For this reason there appears to be a clear incentive for individuals with low wage prospects to remain on
the rolls even if they are capable of earning in excess of the SSA's SGA threshold.
11they may be using a different standard or threshold of disability than the SSA. For example, individuals
may, on average, have an internal standard for judging disability that is too lenient in comparison with
the standard that the SSA employs. In previous work, we have shown in Ben´ tez-Silva, Buchinsky, Chan,
Cheidvasser, and Rust (2003), (hereafter BBCCR), that  a and  d are unbiased indicators of each other, i.e.,
we were unable to reject the hypothesis that E[ a   djx] = 0, where x is a vector of objective indicators
of health problems and activities of daily living (ADLs).14 We interpret this unbiased reporting result as
providing strong empirical support for the accurate reporting hypothesis. If the HRS respondents had a
signicantly more lenient disability threshold than the SSA, we would expect their self-reported disability
status to be upward-biased relative to the SSA, i.e., we would expect to nd that E[  d   ajx] > 0.
The BBCCR study was also unable to reject a more specic hypothesis about how applicants' self-
reported disability status relates to SSA'sultimate awarddecision, the rational unbiased reporting hypothesis
(RUR). The SSA's award decision can be approximated by a threshold rule of the form  a = I(xba+ea > 0),
where I denotes the usual indicator function, x is a vector of observable (and veriable) characteristics of
the applicant including indicators of health conditions, ADLs, etc., and ea is a random variable representing
the effect of bureaucratic noise and other unobserved factors that affect the SSA's award decision. Thus,
the SSA awards the applicant if xba +ea > 0 and denies the applicant if xba +ea  0. The parameters
of the vector ba represent the relative weights (or importance) of various health conditions in the SSA's
award decision. As discussed above, there are certain physical conditions in SSA's Blue Book that it
deems sufciently severe to result in automatic qualication for DI benets. We can account for this with
a threshold rule with sufciently large positive values for the components of ba that correspond to the
indicators of the various listing conditions.
We can also represent the individual's self-reported disability status as a threshold rule of the form
 d = I(xbd +ed > 0), where x is the same vector of veriable health indicators that the SSA observes, bd
is a vector of weights that the individual assigns to various health conditions and ADLs in making their
own judgment of whether or not they are capable of working, and ed is a random variable reecting the
net effect of other information that the applicant observes, but the SSA (and the econometrician) does not
observe. Under the assumption that ea and ed are normally distributed random variables, and given identi-
fying normalizations on the variances of ea and ed and/or the coefcient vectors, it is possible to estimate
the vectors of weights bd and ba that represent the SSA's and the applicants' threshold rules determining  a
14 Our previous study also provides strong evidence that our inability to reject this hypothesis is not due to limited numbers of
observations or statistical tests that have low power. We were able to decisively reject the hypothesis that E[ a   djx] = 0 when  a is
identied as initial award decision by the DDS (i.e., the initial award decision made by the DDS before the possibility of appeals
are considered).
12and  d. The rational unbiased reporting hypothesis corresponds to the hypothesis that ba = bd, i.e., the SSA
and the individual use the same weights in their threshold rules for  a and  d, respectively. In BBCCR we
were unable to reject this hypothesis, which, due to its parametric nature, implies a stronger restriction on
the data than the unbiased reporting hypothesis, E[ a   djx] = 0, so the corresponding hypothesis tests had
even greater power.
We view the RUR hypothesis as providing strong evidence that DI and SSI applicants are aware of
the SSA's disability award process and adopt the SSA's standard in their own self-classication of whether
or not they are disabled. The only reason why the SSA's ultimate award decision  a differs from the ap-
plicant's self-reported disability status  d is that  a is affected by the bureaucratic noise ea, whereas the
individual's self-reported disability status  d depends on the applicant's private information ed about other
unobserved health conditions and mental factors (i.e., the intangible motivation or determination factors
discussed previously) that affect whether or not the applicant can work in spite of his/her physical impair-
ments. Changes in the social/political regime that affect the degree of leniency in the SSA's standard for
judging whether a DI or SSI applicant is disabled can be represented as changes in the ba weights in the
threshold rule representing its ultimate award decisions. If regimes change sufciently slowly so that po-
tential applicants can learn and adapt to the new disability standard, then the RUR hypothesis should hold
independently of the particular regime and overall degree of leniency in the SSA'saward process. Additional
evidence supporting this hypothesis is provided by Bound and Waidmann (1992), who compared time series
data on self-reported disability to DI awards and rolls. They concluded that The changes in the fraction
receiving benets seem to have closely mirrored changes in the number of men (self) identied as disabled.
(p. 1416).
Although the period of our study, 1992-1996, can be regarded as a lenient regime (since this was
under the Clinton Administration when aggregate award rates were much higher than the historical aver-
age, reaching an all time high of 52% in 1998), our procedure for separating the question of leniency from
the question of accuracy of the DI award process prevents us from making any judgments about whether
the SSA's acceptance rates were too high during this period. However, there is an aspect of our analysis
that could be interpreted as stacking the cards against the SSA in our evaluation of its accuracy. This is
due to our interpretation that the unobservable component ea affecting the SSA's ultimate award decision
 a represents bureaucratic noise (i.e., random mistakes), whereas the unobservable component ed affect-
ing an individual's self-reported disability  d represents private information on health conditions that are
unobserved by the SSA and by the HRS interviewers.
An alternative interpretation of the RUR hypothesis is that ea represents private information that the
13SSA has about the true health condition of the applicant that we do not observe, and ed represents idiosyn-
cratic errors or deviations in individuals' personal thresholds for reporting whether they are disabled or
not. Under this alternative interpretation, we could regard  a as representing a measure of true disability.
Of course, under this alternative interpretation the SSA would make no classication errors, and the de-
viations we observe between  a and  d are entirely due to idiosyncratic errors made by individuals in their
self-reported disability status.
We dismiss the possibility that the SSA's ultimate award decision  a corresponds to the relevant notion
of true disability because it seems implausible that the SSA would ever be able to gather all the relevant
private information that affects whether an individual is capable of working or not. In particular, as indicated
above, there are important intangible factors, such as motivation or determination, that have an effect on
whether a person is capable of working. These types of factors would be known by the applicant, but would
be difcult, if not impossible, for the SSA to observe.
We do, however, acknowledge the possibility that, in addition to private information on health conditions
and intangible factors such as motivation or determination entering the residual term ed in our model of self-
reported disability, ed could also reect other individual-specic biases, or errors in judgment, about
whether the person is really disabled. In this case it would be wrong to ascribe all of the discrepancies
between  a and  d to mistakes on the part of the SSA. To handle this case we introduce a third binary latent
variable,  t, representing the applicant's true disability status. We assume that both  a and  d are noisy but
unbiased indicators of  t so that we have E[ tjx] = E[ ajx] = E[  djx]. We also assume that  t can be represented
by a threshold rule  t = I(xbt+et > 0).
Hereafter we assume that the RUR hypothesis holds and that the latent indicator of true disability is
determined according to the same social/political standard as the SSA's award decision. Thus, we have that
b ba = bd = bt=st, where st is the standard deviation of unobservable variables that affect true disability
status  t. In this case both  a and  d are noisy but unbiased indicators of the applicant's true disability status  t.
While the residual term in the SSA'saward decision ea may reect bureaucratic noise and the residual term
in an individual's self-reported disability  d may reect idiosyncratic biases and judgment errors, we assume
that the residual term et in the equation for true disability  t contains only unobserved private information on
the applicant's health status and is free from noise or idiosyncratic judgmental biases. In general there may
be common components in the three residual terms that cause these variables to be correlated. We assume
that et, ea and ed have a multivariate normal distribution and we will impose restrictions on the correlations
between these error terms that will enable us to compute classication error rates using Bayes rule.
145 Measuring Disability and Health Status in the HRS
This section provides a brief description of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), the data set we use
to measure health and disability status of a sample of older Americans. The HRS provides highly detailed
information on health and disability status, making it one of the best available data sets for conducting our
analysis. We also include tabulations comparing several objective and subjective characteristics for various
subsamples of DI applicants, non-applicants, recipients, and rejectees. Our results conrm previous con-
clusions by Ben´ tez-Silva et al. (1999) that self-reported disability status,  d, is a very powerful predictor of
application, appeal, and award decisions, and better predicts a wide range of objective health and functional
limitation measures, labor supply, and economic status measures, than the SSA's ultimate award decision  a.
Indeed, when we classify applicants as disabled or non-disabled according to their self-reported disabil-
ity  d we obtain much better discrimination between the two groups in terms of the degree of severity of
an array of objective health status indicators and activities of daily living than we obtain when we classify
individuals as disabled or non-disabled using the SSA's ultimate award decision  a. For example, we nd
that disabled rejectees (i.e., individuals for whom  d = 1 and  a = 0) are much closer in terms of observed
characteristics to disabled awardees (i.e., individuals for whom  d = 1 and  a = 1) than they are to non-
disabled rejectees (i.e., individuals for whom  d = 0 and  a = 0). Similarly, we nd that disabled awardees
are much closer to disabled rejectees in terms of their observed health condition than they are tonon-disabled
awardees. This suggests that if the SSA had the luxury of being able to observe applicants' truthful self-
assessments of their disability status (i.e.,  d), then they would have been able to do a much better job in
discriminating among those who are truly disabled from those who are not disabled. Of course, the SSA
does not have this luxury, since all DI and SSI applicants would presumably report that they are unable to
work in order to maximize the chances of being awarded benets. However, in Section 8 we show that
there is a feasible way for the SSA to improve its ability to discriminate between disabled and non-disabled
applicants by using a statistical model that predicts the probability being disabled, Pf  d = 1jXg, in terms of
a large number of objectively veriable health conditions and activities of daily living, X.
5.1 Measurement and Data Issues
The data for our study come from the rst three interviews of the HRS, a nationally representative longi-
tudinal survey of 7,700 households whose heads were between the ages of 51 and 61 at the time of the
rst interview in 1992 or 1993. Each adult member of the household was interviewed separately, yielding
a total of 12,652 individual records. Waves two and three were conducted in 1994/95 and 1996/97, respec-
15tively, using computer assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) which allows for much better control of skip
patterns and reduces recall errors.15 The HRS has several advantages over the alternative sources of data
previously used to analyze the DIaward process such as the SIPPdata. The HRSis a panel focusing on older
individuals, with separate survey sections devoted to health, disability, and employment. The health section
contains numerous questions on objective and subjective indicators of health status, as well as questions
pertaining to activities of daily living (ADLs), instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs), and cognition
variables. In the disability section respondents were asked to indicate the dates they applied for DI benets
or appealed a denial, and whether or not they were awarded benets.
However, the HRS does have some limitations that make it somewhat more complicated to study the
DI award process. First, unlike the SIPP data, there is no match to the SSA Master Beneciary Record, so
we are unable to verify individuals' self-reported information on dates of application and appeal for SSDI
and SSI benets. Second, the HRS did not distinguish between SSI and SSDI applications, so all questions
regarding disability implicitly combine the two programs into a single category.16 Finally, the HRS did not
include appropriate follow-up questions that would have allowed us to determine whether DI applications
or appeals reported in previous surveys had been awarded or denied, or whether they were still pending,
resulting in potential censoring of information on appeals and reapplications. Fortunately, we were able
to rectify some of these censoring problems using other information in the HRS. For example, the income
section of wave two of the HRS included a question about whether respondents received Social Security
income, and if so, the type of Social Security Income (DI benets, retirement, etc.) and the date at which
the respondent began to receive those benets. For a previously pending case, an observed receipt of DI
benets after the application/appeal signied acceptance into the program. If no benets had been received
after 24 months following the application/appeal, we inferred a denial since virtually no cases are pending
for longer than two years.17
Individual decisions as to when to apply or appeal for disability benets are made in continuous time.18
However, we observe individuals' health variables at points in time that are roughly two years apart. To most
closely approximate an individuals' characteristics at the time of the application, we restrict our attention to
the application/appeal episodes that were initiated within a one-year window surrounding the interview date
(six months before to six months after), yielding a total of 387 observations.19
15 Additional individuals, mostly new spouses of previous respondents, were added in waves two and three. We include these
respondents in our analysis, yielding a total of 13,142 individual records.
16 Henceforth, DI will denote both SSDI and SSI unless otherwise noted.
17 Additional strategies used to resolve ambiguous cases are detailed in Ben´ tez-Silva et al. (1999) and BBCCR.
18 Given the panel nature of the HRS, we allow a single individual to yield several application episodes. We observe a maximum
of three application episodes per person in the data, but most individuals have only one episode.
19 We have experimented with windows of different length, and although this affects the number of observations, it does not
165.2 Data Analysis
Ben´ tez-Silva et al. (1999) and BBCCR conducted an internal validation of the quality of our constructed
disability histories and the accuracy of individuals' responses to the HRS questions. In those papers we
compared the dates of disability onset, application, and award, with a set of monthly labor supply dummy
variables constructed from the work history section of the HRS. Since the two sets of variables were con-
structed independently using data from separate sections of the survey, there is no guarantee that the dates
of the break in labor supply would correspond with the dates of disability onset. Yet, they match almost
perfectly. Specically, the results show a dramatic 50 percentage point drop in the labor force participation
rate in the month following the onset of disability, falling from over 60% to under 15%. The conclusions
are robust to screening out the 52% of the sample for which imputations on the dates of disability onset,
application, or award were made.
We now turn to Tables 3 and 4, which summarize the characteristics of our sample, presenting means
and standard deviations of various economic and health status measures. In Table 3 we compare observed
characteristics for DI/SSI applicants and non-applicants, while in Table 4 we compare the characteristics of
awardees and rejectees for a subset of DI and SSI applicants for which we have uncensored observations on
their application (including appeals, if any) and their award or denial of benets, following the application
or appeal. To obtain uncensored observations, we excluded applicants whose cases are still pending (either
via the initial DDS decision or via an appeal to an ALJ). This provided us with a subset of DI applicants
for whom we could determine the ultimate award decision by the SSA. This is the subsample that we use
in BBCCR for testing the accuracy of self-reported disability status, and here for assessing the magnitude
of classication errors in the DI award process. In each of these tables we further divide the groups into
disabled and non-disabled individuals according to the value of the self-reported disability indicator  d.
Comparing columns (1) and (2) of Table 3, we see that DI applicants are signicantly worse off than
non-applicants in terms of both physical health and economic status. The income of non-applicants is more
than four times higher and their net worth is nearly three times higher than applicants. The non-applicants
also worked substantially more hours in the year prior to their interview, 1,458 hours versus 982 hours for
applicants. Also, DI applicants are signicantly more likely to be female and non-white, and they appear
less likely to have a family support network. For example, only 66% of DI applicants are married, compared
to 82% for non-applicants. Applicants also have signicantly less education: only 7% of applicants have a
BA degree, compared to 23% for non-applicants. Although applicants do have earned income, the average
amount earned is very close to the $6,000 SGA threshold prevailing over the 1992-1996 sample period.
signicantly alter our results.
17The remaining rows of Table 3 show that applicants are signicantly less healthy than non-applicants
according to virtually all subjective and objective measures of health and ADLs. In the year prior to their
interview, applicants had made 9 more visits to a doctor than non-applicants, were hospitalized nearly six
times more often, and were 18 times more likely to have had an overnight stay in a nursing home. As for
ADLs, a higher percentage of DI applicants report difculty doing various simple tasks than non-applicants:
walking across a room (15% vs. 0.8%), getting up from a chair (59% vs. 21%), sitting for a long time (46%
vs. 14%), or climbing stairs (47% vs. 5%). These high percentages suggest that many DI applicants do have
difculty performing common physical tasks that are part of most jobs. The objective health measures
indicate, for example, that 24% of applicants had heart problems compared to only 7% of non-applicants
and that 18% of applicants have lung disease, compared to only 5% of non-applicants. The patterns for
cancer, strokes, psychological problems and many other health problems not listed in Table 3 show a similar
pattern, something that should not come as a surprise.
Focusing on columns (3) and (4) of Table 3, we see that all of the objective health status indicators and
ADLs are worse for the subsample of SSDI and SSI applicants who were disabled, i.e. those who reported
that they had a health problem that prevented them from working entirely (i.e.  a = 1). For example 9% of
disabled applicants reported having a stroke compared to 3% of non-disabled applicants. Similarly the rate
of heart problems and psychological problems is three times higher among disabled applicants.
At the bottom of Table 3 we provide c2 tests for the equality of means between the different sub-samples
given in the columns of Table 3.20 In all cases we clearly reject the null hypothesis that the compared sub-
populations are the same. The fact that most of the populations are different is not surprising, since the
c2 statistics merely provide a convenient metric for summarizing the overall distance between health and
functional status indicators for the various subgroups presented.
Although DI applicants are clearly in much poorer health than non-applicants, only 70% of the DI ap-
plicants reported that their health condition prevented them from working entirely. The 348 non-disabled
applicants could represent the imposters who are attempting to game the system hoping that the SSA
will make an award error and accept their application. We see from Table 3 that the non-disabled applicants
are in signicantly better health compared to the disabled applicants, at least in terms of all of the observable
health indicators and ADLs presented in Table 3. The c2 statistics at the bottom of Table 3 indicates that we
can decisively reject the hypothesis that the means of these health indicators and ADLs are the same for the
20 All tests compare the means of the following variables for the different subgroups of the population: number of hospital-
izations, nursing home stays, and doctor visits in the previous year, and the dummy variables poor health, stroke, cancer, heart
problems, psychological problems, difculty reading a map, pick up a dime from a table, taking a bath, sitting for a long time,
getting up from a chair, walking across a room, and climbing a ight of stairs.
18disabled and non-disabled subpopulations of applicants.
It is also interesting to compare disabled applicants with disabled non-applicants, in columns (4)
and (5) of Table 3. We see that for most of the health indicators and ADLs, the disabled applicants are
about as close to the disabled non-applicants than they are to non-disabled applicants. Indeed, these two
groups are fairly similar in terms of their c2 statistics reported at the bottom of Table 3. The main difference
between the two groups is that disabled non-applicants are signicantly older and more likely to be white,
female, and married. Many of these disabled non-applicants are married women who have not accumulated
the 20 quarters of coverage necessary to be covered by DI and whose spouses' income or assets exceeds the
means-test threshold for eligibility for SSI benets. This hypothesis is conrmed by the fact that 59% of the
disabled non-applicants are ineligible for SSI, whereas only 20% of the applicants are ineligible.21
It is worth emphasizing that the distance between populations is much larger when we compare disabled
and non-disabled individuals than when we compare applicants to non-applicants, recipients to rejectees, or
awardees to rejectees. We conclude that self-reported disability  d is a more powerful predictor of more ob-
jective health and functional status measures than other indicators, such as the indicators for having applied
for DI, or being an SSI or DI recipient. In other words, the self-reported disability measure is superior to
knowledge of the SSA's award decision as a determinant of the respondents' other health status measures.
These ndings are consistent with our hypothesis that  d is an indicator of true disability and that the
award decision  a is a noisy indicator of  d. For example, the c2 statistic measuring the distance between
the disabled and non-disabled populations is 2,932, which is 50% larger than the c2 statistic measuring the
distance between applicants and non-applicants.
Table 3 also provides evidence of self-selection in the DI application decision. The mere act of applying
for DIreveals agreat deal ofinformation about the applicant, since very fewhealthy, wealthy, orhigh income
individuals apply for DI benets. It is likely that this self-selection is largely due to rational behavior on
the part of applicants. That is, healthy, well educated individuals know they are likely to be denied, and
given the progressive structure of Social Security benets, high income individuals have less of a nancial
incentive to apply for DI since they receive a much lower replacement rate than do low income individuals.
21 See Ben´ tez-Silva et al. (1999) for an explanation of the construction of the eligibility variable. Another reason why disabled
non-applicants may not be applying for benets is that their mean age is 60.9, only slightly more than a year away from eligibility
for early retirement benets from Social Security at age 62. Ben´ tez- Silva et al. (1999) show that the propensity to apply for DI
benets declines sharply near the eligibility age for Social Security retirement benets. The latter effect might seem rather puzzling,
after all, there is nothing preventing individuals from applying for disability at any age before the NRA, especially if access to SSDI
will guarantee a higher lifetime benet than retiring under the Old Age benets system before the NRA. However, we have to take
into account the costs imposed on applicants in the form of not being able to earn above the SGA threshold, having to hire a lawyer
if they need to appeal their cases beyond the DDS stage, and also the reduction in the level of disability benets resulting from
having received retirement benets up to the time of starting to receive SSDI benets.
19Table 3: Characteristics of DI Applicants and Non-Applicants
SSI/DI Applicants SSI/DI Non-Applicants
Variable SSI/DI SSI/DI
Applicants Non-Applicants Non-Disabled Disabled Disabled Non-Disabled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of Observations 1,179 27,415 348 831 955 26,460
Age 55.5 57.4 55.1 55.7 60.9 57.2
(0.4) (0.4) (5.5) (4.3) (6.3) (5.7)
White 55.2 75.6 55.7 55.8 63.7 76.0
(1.4) (0.3) (2.7) (1.7) (1.6) (0.3)
Male 43.0 44.9 39.9 44.3 42.0 45.0
(1.4) (0.3) (2.6) (1.7) (1.6) (0.3)
Married 65.5 82.4 66.4 65.1 78.7 82.5
(1.4) (0.2) (2.5) (1.6) (1.3) (0.2)
BA 7.2 23.0 8.9 6.5 7.8 23.5
(0.7) (0.2) (1.5) (0.9) (0.9) (0.3)
Prof. Degree 1.5 8.3 2.0 1.3 1.7 8.5
(0.4) (0.2) (0.7) (0.4) (0.4) (0.2)
Respondent Income 6,478 27,415 8,681 5,541 3,516 25,425
(12,714) (71,711) (13,769) (12,117) (12,225) (72,707)
Net Worth 91,994 265,698 86,180 94,458 161,604 269,130
(197,857) (536,364) (153,228) (213,933) (413,295) (539,602)
Annual Hours Worked 982 1,458 1,151 916 252 1,496
(40) (7) (77) (47) (25) (7)
Ineligible for SSI 19.5 26.4 20.5 19.0 58.6 25.3
(1.2) (0.3) (2.2) (1.4) (1.6) (0.3)
Hospital Stays 1.15 0.18 1.00 1.21 0.83 0.15
(3.9) (0.9) (5.3) (3.1) (3.4) (0.6)
Doctor Visits 14.0 5.0 10.8 15.3 12.1 4.7
(15.7) (6.9) (13.7) (16.3) (11.9) (6.5)
Poor Health 43.0 2.4 29.3 48.7 28.1 1.5
(1.4) (0.1) (2.4) (1.7) (1.5) (0.1)
Health Limitation 70.5 3.5 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
Prevents Work (1.3) (0.1) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.00)
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SSI/DI Applicants SSI/DI Non-Applicants
Variable SSI/DI SSI/DI
Applicants Non-Applicants Non-Disabled Disabled Disabled Non-Disabled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Is it difcult for you to:
Walk across a room? 14.8 0.8 10.6 16.5 11.9 0.4
(1.0) (0.1) (1.6) (1.3) (1.0) (0.1)
Sit for long time? 45.7 13.7 36.2 49.8 45.0 12.6
(1.4) (0.2) (2.6) (1.7) (1.6) (0.2)
Get up from a chair? 58.6 20.6 47.4 63.2 59.2 19.2
(1.4) (0.2) (2.7) (1.7) (1.6) (0.2)
Climb Stairs? 46.7 5.5 35.6 51.4 38.5 4.3
(1.4) (0.1) (2.6) (1.7) (1.6) (0.1)
Take a Bath? 15.1 0.8 9.2 17.6 11.6 0.4
(1.0) (0.1) (1.5) (1.3) (1.0) (0.1)
Reading a Map? 32.6 14.6 33.5 32.2 33.1 13.9
(1.3) (0.2) (2.6 (1.6) (1.6) (0.2)
Pick up a Dime? 15.8 2.3 13.0 16.9 13.3 1.9
(1.1) (0.1) (1.8 (1.3) (1.1) (0.1)
Have you ever had:
Cancer? 4.8 0.8 4.3 5.0 1.78 0.8
(0.73) (0.10) (1.29) (0.89) (0.65) (0.10)
Lung Disease? 18.2 4.6 16.4 19.0 15.1 4.2
(1.1) (0.1) (2.0) (1.4) (1.2) (0.1)
Stroke? 7.4 0.4 3.4 9.0 4.7 0.3
(0.8) (0.04) (1.0) (1.0) (0.7) (0.03)
Heart Problems? 23.8 6.7 18.1 26.1 22.1 6.1
(1.2) (0.1) (2.0) (1.5) (1.3) (0.1)
Psych. Problems? 25.3 6.9 21.0 27.1 20.4 6.4
(1.3) (0.1) (2.2) (1.5) (1.3) (0.1)
Nursing home stay? 3.6 0.2 1.7 4.4 1.6 0.1
(0.6) (0.03) (0.7) (0.7) (0.4) (0.02)
Chi-Square Tests of Equality of Means
Group 1 (# Obs.) Group 2 (# Obs.) c2 df p-value
Disabled (1,596) Non-Disabled (25,927) 2,932 15 0.000
Applicants (1,087) Non-Applicants (26,436) 1,975 15 0.000
Non-Disabled Applicants (333) Disabled Applicants(754) 115 15 0.000
Non-Disabled Non-Applicants (25,594) Disabled Non-Applicants (842) 1;294 15 0.000
Disabled Applicants (754) Disabled Non-Applicants (842) 131 15 0.000
Non-Disabled Applicants (333) Non-Disabled Non-Applicants (25,594) 378 15 0.000
21Table 4: Characteristics of Subset of DI Applicants
Rejectees Awardees
Variable DI DI
Awardees Rejectees Non-Disabled Disabled Disabled Non-Disabled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No. of Observations 283 104 43 61 221 62
Age 56.1 55.0 54.6 55.2 56.4 55.2
(4.3) (5.2) (5.8) (4.6) (3.8) (5.6)
White 59.0 44.2 51.2 39.3 59.7 56.4
(2.9) (4.9) (7.6) (6.2) (3.3) (6.3)
Male 39.2 45.2 48.8 42.6 39.4 38.7
(2.9) (4.9) (7.6) (6.3) (3.3) (6.2)
Married 58.0 63.5 55.8 68.9 57.9 58.1
(2.9) (4.7) (7.6) (5.9) (3.3) (6.3)
BA 6.7 9.6 11.6 8.2 6.8 6.4
(1.5) (2.9) (4.9) (3.5) (1.7) (3.1)
Prof. Degree 1.4 2.9 4.6 1.6 1.4 1.6
(0.7) (1.6) (3.2) (1.6) (0.8) (1.6)
Respondent Income 6,318 5,013 7,521 3,252 5,419 9,435
(10,271) (9,488) (11,819) (6,902) (8,933) (13,491)
Net Worth 76,583 81,847 41,847 114,220 73,911 87,017
(121,890) (244,341) (73,049) (318,387) (106,429) (168,833)
Annual Hours Worked 843 571 836 414 752 1,167
(984) (848) (913) (764) (899) (1,184)
Ineligible for SSI 22.6 32.8 25.8 38.9 25.5 28.3
(3.0) (5.7) (7.9) (8.1) (3.4) (6.6)
Hospital stays 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.8 1.0 0.9
(1.6) (1.6) (0.8) (2.0) (1.4) (1.9)
Doctor Visits 12.9 12.5 12.3 12.7 13.2 11.9
(12.8) (14.2) (17.0) (11.8) (13.1) (11.7)
Poor Health 46.9 39.8 23.8 51.8 49.3 38.7
(3.0) (4.9) (6.6) (6.7) (3.4) (6.2)
Health Limitation 78.1 58.6 0.00 100.00 100.00 0.00




Awardees Rejectees Non-Disabled Disabled Disabled Non-Disabled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Is it difcult for you to:
Walk across a room? 16.6 8.6 2.3 13.1 17.2 14.5
(2.2) (2.8) (2.3) (4.3) (2.5) (4.5)
Sit for long time? 51.9 42.7 30.2 51.7 53.8 45.2
(3.0) (4.9) (7.0) (6.4) (3.3) (6.3)
Get up from a chair? 64.5 49.5 30.2 51.6 53.8 45.2
(3.0) (4.9) (7.0) (6.4) (3.3) (6.3)
Climb stairs? 48.8 38.5 34.9 41.0 51.6 38.7
(3.0) (4.8) (7.3) (6.3) (3.4) (6.2)
Take a Bath? 13.4 12.5 7.0 16.4 14.0 11.3
(2.0) (3.2) (3.9) (4.7) (2.3) (4.0)
Reading a Map? 35.9 36.9 32.6 40.0 35.2 36.1
(2.9) (4.7) (7.1) (6.3) 3.2 6.1
Pick up a Dime? 14.2 20.6 16.3 23.7 15.4 9.9
(2.1) (4.0) (5.6) (5.5) 2.4 3.8
Have you ever had:
Cancer? 4.2 5.8 7.0 4.9 5.0 1.6
1.2) (2.3) (3.9) (2.8) (1.5) (1.6)
Lung Disease? 16.2 14.4 20.9 9.8 17.6 11.3
(2.2) (3.4) (6.2) (3.8) (2.6) (4.0)
Stroke? 6.4 10.6 2.3 16.4 7.7 1.6
(1.4) (3.0) (2.3) (4.7) (1.8) (1.6)
Heart Problem? 21.2 15.4 18.6 13.1 21.7 19.4
(2.4) (3.5) (5.9) (4.3) (2.8) (5.0)
Psychological Problems? 26.15 23.1 20.9 24.6 25.8 27.4
(2.6) (4.1) (6.2) (5.5) (2.9) (5.7)
Nursing home stay? 4.2 1.9 0.00 3.3 5.0 1.6
(1.2) (1.3) (0.00) (2.3) (1.5) (1.6)
Chi-Square Tests of Equality of Means
Group 1 (# Obs.) Group 2 (# Obs.) c2 df p-value
DI Awardees (266) DI Rejectees (94) 27.5 15 0.024
Non-Disabled Rejectees (42) Disabled Rejectees (52) 34.2 14 0.001
Disabled Awardees (206) Non-Disabled Awardees (60) 30.9 15 0.008
Disabled Rejectees (52) Disabled Awardees (206) 18.8 15 0.222
Non-Disabled Rejectees (42) Non-Disabled Awardees (60) 18.8 13 0.173
Non-Disabled Awardees (60) Disabled Rejectees (52) 29.3 15 0.014
Non-Disabled Rejectees (42) Disabled Awardees (206) 75:7 14 0.000
23Table 4 compares the characteristics of awardees and rejectees for the subsample of 387 DI and SSI
applicants for whom we can observe uncensored observations on SSA's ultimate award decision over the
period 1992 to 1996 from the rst 3 waves of the HRS. The SSA's ultimate award decision  a clearly enables
us to discriminate among the applicants in terms of the severity of their health conditions: Nearly all of the
objective health indicators and ADLsfor the awardees are signicantly worse than for rejectees. However,
we nd much larger differences in the objective health characteristics when we separate individuals accord-
ing to self-reported disability status  d than when we separate individuals according to SSA's award decision
 a. We can see this in Table 4 by observing that nearly every health indicator or ADL is signicantly worse
for disabled awardees than for non-disabled awardees. Forexample 5.0% of disabled awardees report having
had cancer compared to 1.6% of non-disabled awardees, and 7.7% of disabled awardees report that they had
a stroke compared to 1.6% for non-disabled awardees. We also nd that almost all of the observed health
indicators for disabled rejectees are signicantly worse than the observed health indicators of non-disabled
rejectees.
At the bottom of Table 4 we report the c2 test statistics for the equality of the means of the various health
indicators and ADLs listed in the table for the different subgroups. While we can reject the hypothesis that
the observed health characteristics of disabled awardees and non-disabled awardees are the same, we are
unable to reject the hypothesis that the health characteristics of disabled awardees and disabled rejectees are
the same. In other words, the data suggests that in terms of observed health characteristics disabled awardees
are much closer to disabled rejectees than to non-disabled awardees. Similarly, non-disabled awardees are
more similar to non-disabled rejectees than they are to disabled awardees.
These ndings are summarized in Figure 3. We see that the c2 distance between awardees and re-
jectees is 28 and statistically signicant, conrming our earlier observation that the SSA's ultimate award
decision  a does discriminate applicants in terms of the severity of objective health indicators. When we clas-
sify awardees based on their self-reported disability status  d, we see that the c2 distance in the observable
health characteristics of disabled awardees and non-disabled awardees, 31, is larger than the c2 distance
between awardees and rejectees. On the other hand, the c2 distance between disabled awardees and dis-
abled rejectees is only 19 and is statistically insignicant. Similarly, the c2 distance between non-disabled
awardees and non-disabled rejectees is also 19 and is statistically insignicant. This clearly suggests that
self-reported disability  d provides a much better means of discriminating among our sample of DI and SSI
applicants in terms of the severity of observable health conditions than the SSA's ultimate award decision  a.
Indeed, the data suggest that if we were interested in awarding benets to the least healthy individuals
in this sample of applicants, the SSA should have awarded benets to the 258 applicants who reported
24that their health impairment was sufciently severe to prevent them from working entirely instead of the
266 people to whom the SSA actually awarded benets. Of course, even if we believe that individuals
provide truthful and accurate self-reports of their disability status in an anonymous interview such as the
HRS, there is little reason to believe that they would truthfully report their disability in an application for
DI or SSI benets to the SSA. Thus, the SSA is at an inherent disadvantage since it must rely on an array
of noisy signals such as the objective health indicators and ADLs shown in Tables 3 and 4. We return to
this issue in Section 8, where we show that it is possible to construct a statistical discriminant function
that uses a subset of the objective health indicators and ADLs that the SSA has access to, but results in
signicantly lower classication error rates than the SSA's current disability award process. This will enable


















Figure 3: Summary of Classication Errors in the DI Award Process
6 Bayesian Estimates of Classication Error Rates
The previous section presented strong empirical support for the hypothesis that the Social Security Award
decision  a and self-reported disability status  d are unbiased accurate indicators of true disability status.
Indeed, Figure 3 from the preceding section suggests that self-reported disability  a is a relatively more
accurate indicator of disability than the SSA's award decision  a, insofar as self-reported disability does a
better job of differentiating individuals according to the severity of their disability as measured by a vector
X of more objectively veriable health problems and activities of daily living. In this section we show how
25this information can be used to measure the magnitude of classication errors in the DI award process. To
give every benet of a doubt to the SSA, we will estimate classication error rates under the assumption that
the SSA's ultimate award decision  a is a more accurate indicator of true disability  t (i.e.  a is more highly
correlated with t) than self-reported disability  d.
As we discussed in the introduction, our analysis of classication errors avoids any judgement as to
whether the SSA's ultimate award decision  a is too strict or lenient relative to some objective, absolute
denition of disability. Instead we assume that the SSA'sadministration of the DI award process sets a social
standard for disability that becomes common knowledge for all individuals applying for disability benets.
This social standard can, and most likely does, change over time. The SSA implements its denition of
disability via its award decisions, and disability applicants are aware of the standard in effect at any given
time and adapt their self-reported disability relative to this social standard. The (RUR) hypothesis, which
we are unable to reject econometrically, states that except for random noise representing differences in
information, random mistakes and idiosyncratic judgement errors, individuals and the SSA use the same
decision rule to determine  d and  a. Econometrically the RUR hypothesis can be stated in terms of the
following conditional moment (CM) restriction:
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where x denotes a vector of observed health and socioeconomic characteristics that are observed by both
the individuals and the SSA. Since  a and  d are Bernoulli random variables, equation (1) is equivalent to
Pr( ajx) = Pr(  djx): In BBCCR (2003) we tested the CM restriction using a battery of different CM tests, but
were unable to reject the null hypothesis that (1) holds.
If we further assume that  a and  d can be represented as index rules with unobservable (to the econome-
trician) factors in these rules entering additively separably as a pair of variables (ea;ed) that have a bivariate
normal distribution, then the conditional probabilities governing  a and  d are represented by the following
bivariate probit model











x0bd +ed  0

= F( x0bd); (2)
where F is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. For this parametric model, the RUR hy-
pothesis implies the restriction that ba = bd. As is commonly done in the literature on discrete choice
models, we normalize the variances of (ea;ed) to 1 but allow them to have an unrestricted correlation coef-
cient l 2 ( 1;1). BBCCR was unable to reject this parametric form of the RUR hypothesis at conventional
signicance levels.
26Now suppose there is a third binary indicator, representing the individual's true disability status  t, which
is not observed by either the SSA or the individuals. We assume that  t can also be represented by an index
rule





The quantities  a and  d can be considered as noisy indicators of true disability  t.
Since true disability  t is unobserved, we need to impose assumptions about the index coefcients bt and
the distribution of the unobserved error terms (ea;ed;et) entering the index representations for (a;d;t) in
order to compute classication errors. The RUR hypothesis implies the restriction that ba = bd. We now
impose additional assumptions that will enable us to compute classication error rates.
Assumption 1: (Joint Normality) The error terms (ea;ed;et) are independent of the vector of observed
characteristics X and have a joint trivariate normal distribution, with variances normalized to 1.22
Assumption 2: (Unbiasedness) The indicators  a and  d are conditionally unbiased indicators of true dis-
ability status  t. Given Assumption 1, this implies that
bt = ba = bd: (4)
Assumption 3: (Projection of (ea;ed) on et) The error terms ea and ed can be represented as projections
on et as
ea = raet+na; (5)
ed = rdet+nd; (6)
where na and nd are independent of et and each other.
Assumption 4: (Equicorrelation of ea and ed with et) The correlation of ea with et is the same as the
correlation of ed with et, i.e.
ra = rd: (7)
22 This normalization, s2
a =s2
d =1, is the most commonly used in the literature, and allows us to estimate ba and bd as described
in BBCCR. Alternatively, one can set s2
a = 1 and set the two constant coefcients in ba and bd to be the same. The main difference
between these two normalizations is that the rst model assumes that the variances of the two latent indices for the SSA and the
individuals are the same, and allow the location of the indices, i.e., the constant coefcients, to differ. In contrast, the second model
assumes that the locations for the SSA and the individuals are the same, but that the SSA and the individuals may have different
variances for the error terms ea and ed, respectively, reecting their differences in the subjective knowledge about the individuals'
disability. Notice that in both cases s2
t is not identied, and one can nd reasons to believe it can be larger or smaller than the
variances of the two other errors. We present results that assume various values for this element. In this version of the paper we
only report results under the rst normalization given that our estimates of sd, when using the second normalization, where not
statistically different from 1 at any traditional level of signicance. The Likelihood Ratio statistic of the test of the model with equal
variances against one that allows them to be different is 1.3279, which follows a c2
1. The p-value is equal to 0.249, so we cannot
reject the hypothesis that both variances are equal to 1.
27Let l denote the correlation of ea and ed. Since  a and  d are observed, we can estimate l via a bivariate
probit model for ( a;  d)as in BBCCR.Assumption 3 implies that l=rard, so the equicorrelation assumption
implies that
ra = rd =
p
l: (8)
With these assumptions it follows that





















The information in (2)-(9) is sufcient for computing the Bayes classication errors for this case. We believe
assumptions 1-3 are relatively innocuous. The key assumption underlying our estimates of the classication
errors is the equicorrelation assumption. Intuitively, this assumption means that both  a and  d are equally
accurate indicators of  t. This seems to be a reasonable compromise between the extremes of assuming
that  t =  d with probability 1 (i.e. that individual self-reports are always right) and  t =  a with probability
1 (i.e. that the SSA's award decision is always right).
We also calculate classication errors under an alternative assumption that implies that the SSA's award
decision is a substantially more accurate indicator of true disability  t than an individual's self-report  d. To
do this we relax the equicorrelation structure (Assumption 4) and the structure imposed by Assumption 3,
and assume instead that the observables terms (ea;ed;et) have an unrestricted covariance matrix, apart from
the normalization that the variances of ea and ed are equal to 1. That is, we assume
e = (et;ea;ed)  N(0;Se); (10)















where we maintain our normalization that sa =sd =1 but allow st to be bigger or smaller than 1 and allow
the correlation coefcients rat and rdt to be unrestricted.
It is not possible to econometrically identify these additional parameters under this weaker assumption,
but we can vary st, rat, and rdt from the values they take under our equicorrelated base case, since we
28can identify all the parameters of the covariance matrix when we impose the equicorrelation assumption.
So to test the robustness of our conclusions, we recompute the classication errors for two alternative cases
where we vary st, rat and rdt away from the values in the base case, and in a direction that is favorable to
the SSA, i.e. where rat is signicantly larger than rdt which implies that  a is a signicantly more accurate
indicator of  t than  d.
We are now ready to compute the classication errors relative to the true measure of disability, that is,
our goal is to compute the: (a) award error, i.e., Pr(e t = 0je a = 1); (b) rejection error, i.e., Pr(e t = 1je a = 0);
(c) Type I error, i.e., Pr(e a = 0je t = 1); and (d) Type II error, i.e., Pr(e a = 1je t = 0).
We demonstrate here how to compute the award error. The computations of the other classication
errors have similar derivations. The award error can be written as
Pr(e t = 0je a = 1) =
￿
Pr(e t = 0je a = 1;x) fx(x)dx; (11)
where fx(x) is the density of the observed characteristics. Note that the probability inside the integral in (11)
can also be written as,
Pr(e t = 0je a = 1;x) = Pr
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e a = 1; e d = 0jx
 ; (13)
and similarly for Pr

e t = 0je a = 1; e d = 1;x

.
The probabilities in the numerator and the denominator in (13) can be easily computed, given the distri-
bution of e in (9) and (10), using, for example, the GHK algorithm and the coefcient estimate for b from
BBCCR. In the example of the probability in the numerator of (13),
Pr(e t = 0;e a = 1; e d = 0jx) = Pr(et <  xb;ea   xb;ed <  xbjx):
The computation of the rejection probability can be done in a similar manner.
Note that for Type I and Type II errors we have, respectively
Pr(e a = 0je t = 1) = Pr(e t = 1je a = 0)
Pr(e a = 0jx)
Pr(e t = 1jx)
; and
Pr(e a = 1je t = 0) = Pr(e t = 0je a = 1)
Pr(e a = 1jx)
Pr(e t = 0jx)
:
29Table 5 presents the Bayes estimates of the classication errors implied by Assumptions 1-2. The rst
row shows the classication errors in the base case, where we also impose Assumptions 3 and 4. Therefore
ea and ed are equicorrelated with et. The common correlation parameter r equals the square root of l, the
correlation between ea and ed. In this case l = :12 and r =
p
l = :34. The award error rate is estimated to
be 21.7%, and the rejection error rate is estimated to be 59.9%.
Table 5: Bayes Classication Errors using Alternative Models
Model Error Type
Award Rejection Type I Type II
a . Equicorrelation case: rad = :12; rat = rdt =
p
rad
st = 1 21.71% 59.94% 23.71% 67.67%
b . Asymmetric correlation case with rad = :12; rat = :4; rdt = :2
st = :9 19.34% 57.49% 21.44% 55.05%
c . Asymmetric correlation case with rad = :12; rat = :5; rdt = :1
st = :8 16.10% 52.03% 19.27% 41.60%
Panels (b) and (c) show the effect of relaxing the equicorrelation assumption (and the structure of As-
sumption 3) in a direction that is favorable to the SSA. Panel (b) shows the results in the case where rdt
is lowered to :2 and rat is increased to :4 and st is decreased to :9. This is intended to reect a situation
where both ea and ed are noisier than et (reecting the effect of bureaucratic errors in  a and idiosyncratic
judgement errors in individuals' self-reports  d), and the correlation of ea with et is assumed to be twice as
high as the correlation between ed and et to reect the assumption that the SSA's award decision is a more
accurate indicator of true disability than the individual's self-report. The classication error rates decrease
in this case, but they are still quite high: the award and rejection error rates fall by only 2 percentage points
to 19:3% and 57:5% percent, respectively.
The nal panel shows the classication error rates in an even more extreme case where we have reduced
the variance of st to only 0:8, a full 20% reduction in the variance of et relative to the unit normalized
variances for ea and ed in the base case, and the correlation between ea and et is increased to :5, which is 5
times higher than the correlation between ed and et. The award error rate falls by a little over 5 percentage
points in this case, to 16.1%, and the rejection error rate falls by nearly 8 percentage points, to 52%.
30Thus, we conclude that a) award and rejection error rates are high, and b) rejection error rates are more
than twice as high as award error rates, and are robust to fairly big changes in the covariance matrix for
(ea;ed;et) in directions that are favorable to SSA (i.e. which tend to reduce classication errors). Interest-
ingly, nding b) is consistent with the Nagi study discussed in section 2: that study also found that rejection
error rate was more than twice as high as the award error rate. The 19% award error rate in the Nagi study
is consistent with panel b of Table 5, although the rejection error rates in Table 5 are uniformly higher than
the 48% rejection error rate found in Nagi's study.
Note that the Bayes estimates of classication error rates are quite close to the classication error rates
that result from the assumption that  d =  t with probability 1. This suggests that self-reported disability  d is
a very accurate measure of true disability status  t, and is consistent with the results of the previous section
that suggest that self-reported disability is actually a more accurate indicator of true disability status than
the Social Security's award decision.
7 Analysis of the sources of errors in the disability award process
This section attempts to provide more insight into the source of the high classication errors in the SSA's
disability award process. We analyze the multi-stage award and appeal process that was summarized in
section 5, assigning classication errors to each stage of the process. In order to carry out this analysis,
we will need to invoke the assumption that  d =  t with probability 1. As we noted in the previous section,
our estimates of classication error rates are not substantially affected by this assumption relative to the
assumption that both  a and  d are noisy indicators of true disability status  t.
Figure 4 presents a simplied schematic diagram of the SSA's complete disability award process, with
estimated classication error rates presented at each stage of the process. The rst level of the gure rep-
resents the individual's decision whether or not to apply for benets. Over the period of analysis, 4.1% of
individuals in the HRS applied for DI and the remaining 95.9% did not apply. The nal node presents
the outcome of the overall award process, including all possible appeals. The ultimate award rate is
76.6%, with an award error rate of 23.2% and a rejection error rate of 53.5%; that is, Pr( a = 1) = :766,
Pr(  d = 0j a = 1) = :232, and Pr(  d = 1j a = 0) = :535.23
Although the magnitude of these classication error rates provides evidence of considerable noise in
the DI award process, it is clear that the SSA award decision  a is not arbitrary. Figure 4 indicates that  a
is an informative signal, positively correlated with  d, that succeeds in partially differentiating disabled and
23 Notice that these numbers are slightly different from the ones in Table 4 due to the fact that in this gure we are not restricting
the sample of applications to be in a one year window around an interview date.
31non-disabled applicants. In particular, a disabled applicant has an 82.5% probability of ultimately being
awarded benets compared to the much lower award rate of 62.1% for non-disabled applicants. Still, 62.1%
is a surprisingly high award rate for non-disabled applicants, suggesting that there could be relatively high
returns for imposters to apply for DI benets. This may be the reason was why 29.5% of DI applicants
report that they are not disabled (see Level 1 of Figure 4).
Figure 4: Analysis of Classication Errors in SSA's Disability Award Process
Level 2 of Figure 4 shows the results of the SSA's rst-stage award decision made by one of the 54 DDS
centers, as discussed in Section 4. For our HRS sample, the rst-stage award rate is only 57%, far smaller
than the 76.6% ultimate award rate. This suggests that the eligibility threshold is signicantly higher at the
DDS stage than at the ALJ appeal level, depicted in level 4 of Figure 4. In particular, although the rate of
award error is the same for the DDS stage as for the overall award process, the DDSs incur a signicantly
higher rate of rejection errors, 64.4% vs. 57.7%, respectively, suggesting that the DDS centers are erring on
32the side of rejecting applicants. This might be a reasonable strategy, since a rejected applicant has the option
to appeal, whereas DI awardees are unlikely to leave the rolls except via death or conversion to Old Age
benets at age 65. It seems plausible that the SSA perceives higher political and nancial costs to making
an award error relative to a rejection error, since the former can be more visible (e.g., via media expos´ es)
and perhaps more difcult for the SSA to ferret out via Continuing Disability Reviews (CDRs). It is quite
likely that the SSA may perceive a lower cost of rejecting applications at the rst stage, especially since an
individual is entitled to appeal an early rejection.
However, the conclusion that the DDS stage is more stringent and more inaccurate than later stages is
not warranted given the self-selected nature of the pool of applicants choosing to appeal DDS rejections.
This can be seen from level 3 of Figure 4. Although about two-thirds of rejected applicants choose to appeal,
disabled candidates are much more likely to appeal than non-disabled candidates (73.1% vs. 46.6%). This
implies that the self-selected pool of appealed cases considered by the ALJs has a higher proportion of truly
disabled applicants than does the initial pool considered by the DDS (74% vs. 70%). Of the 52% of the
initially rejected applicants who chose not to appeal, 62% are non-disabled.
The fourth level of Figure 4 represents the ALJ decision. The award rate at this stage, 71.7%, is sub-
stantially higher than at the DDS level. Despite this, the ALJ award error rate is slightly lower than that
incurred by the DDSs (22.6% vs. 23.4%). This provides counterevidence to the claim implicit in the GAO
study of the appeal process discussed in section 2, namely, that the ALJs are too lenient and increase award
errors through judicial reversals of poorly documented (but presumably valid) rejections at the DDS stage.
Our results suggest that the ALJ contribution to the award process is benecial, decreasing the high award
error rate incurred by the DDS. Interestingly, we see that the rate of rejection errors among ALJs, 65.3%, is
actually slightly higher than the 64.4% rejection error rate at the DDS level.
In terms of the type-dependent success rates, both disabled and non-disabled applicants have a higher
chance of being awarded benets at the ALJ stage than at the DDS stage. However, the ALJ does improve
a disabled applicant's odds of being awarded compared to those of a non-disabled applicant. At the DDS
stage, disabled applicants have a 31% higher chance (14.6 percentage points) of being awarded benets
than non-disabled applicants. This difference decreases to 20% (or 12.7 percentage points) at the ALJ
level. Despite the fact that the ALJs offer no major improvement in screening quality, the fact that there
is signicant self-selection in the appeal decision combined with the uniformly higher acceptance rates at
the ALJ stage succeed in reducing the overall rate of rejection errors without increasing the overall rate of
award errors. This result is contrary to the suggestions implicit in the GAO report and the recent literature
on the disability process reform reviewed in Section 9.
33Although it is difcult to quantify how much of the screening is accomplished by the applicants them-
selves, through self-selection, and how much is achieved by the SSA, through its monitoring technology,
it is important to note that the ALJs have a signicant advantage over the DDSdue to the self-selected nature
of those choosing to appeal. That is, 74% of rejected applicants who appeal are disabled compared to 48%
of those who choose not to appeal. The initially denied applicants who appeal are a subset of an already
highly self-selected applicant population, 70% of whom are disabled. The nature of the self-screening of
applicants is closely related to the structure of the disability award process, most importantly the delays at
the various stages. In previous work (Ben´ tez-Silva et al. 1999), we estimated the delay distributions at each
stage of the award process and showed that the truly disabled individuals (i.e., those for whom  d = 1) are
more likely to persist at each stage, and ultimately be awarded benets.
As noted above, to the extent that SSA does make fairly accurate classications, most of the credit
appears to be responsible to the applicants themselves, due to self-screening in the application and appeal
process. Part of the self-screening is due to the non-disabled individuals' perception of the odds for being
awarded benets. Overall, a disabled applicant has a higher expected success rate (82.5%) than does a
non-disabled applicant (62.1%). Nevertheless, this difference does not seem large enough to explain the
magnitude of the observed self-selection in the application and appeal decisions. Another key explanation
for the self-selectivity is processing delays. While some the delays are unintentional, in that they resulted
from the rapid recent increases in application rates, delays also have important strategic consequences for
applicants. Specically, delays tend to act as an application fee that assists the SSA in distinguishing
between disabled and non-disabled candidates. The SSA is able to use this price discrimination, because
non-disabled applicants incur a greater opportunity cost than truly disabled individuals, for whom the
opportunity cost is, essentially, zero. However, to the extent that there are liquidity constraints, preventing
an applicant from borrowing to nance consumption during the long period that an application is pending
and the applicant is out of work, delays do impose deadweight welfare costs on all applicants. A more
structural approach would be required to incorporate these real welfare costs as an important component of
the overall costs and benets of the current DI process.
Many of the conclusions from our analysis are consistent with problems that a previous SSA commis-
sioner, Kenneth Apfel, noted in the disability award process, particularly the problem of excess stringency
on the part of the DDS which are counteracted by frequent reversals at the ALJ stage:
The SSA strives to deliver the highest levels of service by making fair, consistent and timely
decisions at all adjudicative levels. However, applicants and beneciaries sometimes nd the
current process complex, confusing and impersonal. Some also perceive the process as one in
which different decisions are reached on similar cases at different levels of the administrative
34review process, thus requiring applicants to maneuver through multiple appeals steps before
they receive benets. Furthermore, denial cases are more error prone than are allowance cases
at the initial claims level while the opposite is true at the hearing level. (Apfel 1999, p.11).
Apfel's assertion that denial cases are more error prone than allowance cases is consistent with our nding:
The DDS rejection error rate is 64%, while the award error rate is only 23%. In contrast, our results do not
accord with Apfel's statement that award cases are more error prone than denial cases at the hearing (ALJ)
level. Our results indicate that the ALJs have virtually the same award and rejection error rates as the DDS,
i.e. a 23% rate of award errors and a 65% rate of rejection errors.
8 Analysis of a statistical screening rule for disability determinations
This section shows that it is possible to outperform SSA's disability award process by using an optimal
statistical screening rule to determine award decisions. The optimal procedure takes the form of an index
rule that accepts applicants when the calculated disability index x0b is sufciently large. We compare the
error rates incurred under the current disability process to those implied by the optimal screening procedure,
and show that this screening procedure signicantly reduces the award and rejection errors in the disability
award process. We then discuss some caveats and problems that might arise in its implementation. In
particular, the use of computerized screening procedures does not obviate the need for human input. We
conclude with a discussion of some of the higher level bureaucratic incentive problems that are involved in
implementing alternative screening procedures, including the proposed disability process reforms discussed
in the next section.
The idea behind the statistical screening rule is simple. The RUR hypothesis implies that self-reported
disability  d is an unbiased signal of true disability status  t. If SSA had the luxury of observing each
applicant's status  d, it could simply use  d as the basis for its award decisions. But, of course, the SSA does
not have this luxury. Suppose, however, that SSA has access to either 1) a training sample of applicants
who did truthfully reveal their disability status  d to a neutral third party (such as the self-reports in an
anonymous survey such as the HRS), or 2) unbiased measurements of  t for a set of applicants that have
been obtained via independent determinations of a group of experts such as the moderated team decision in
the Nagi study discussed in section 2. In either of these two cases, the unbiasedness of the measurements
implies that the training sample can be used to estimate the probability of being truly disabled as a function
of the objectively measurable characteristics x. That is, these training samples can be used to estimate the
probability an applicant is truly disabled, Pft = 1jxg, as a function of their characteristics x.
35Using this estimated probability, consider a test of the hypothesis that a given applicant is disabled. By
the Neyman Pearson Lemma the optimal statistical procedure (i.e. the uniformly most powerful hypothesis
test of xed size) is a likelihood ratio test: reject H0 (the null hypothesis that the applicant is disabled) if




Note that rejecting H0 is equivalent to the decision to award disability benets, and this is equivalent to the
following rule: reject the applicant if and only if the predicted probability of being disabled is sufciently
small:




Neyman and Pearson proved that such a rule is optimal in the sense that no other statistical screening rule
results in a smaller probability that a truly disabled applicant would be rejected given any xed size. In this
case the size of this test is equivalent to the probability of rejecting an applicant who is really disabled.
Thus, this rule is optimal in the sense that it minimizes the probability of accepting applicants who are not
disabled, given any xed probability of rejecting applicants who are disabled.
We implement this rule by using a consistent estimate of Pft = 1jxg. In our case, using self-reported
disability data  d from the HRSwe estimate the probability  Pf  d =1jxg of being disabled. This is a consistent
estimator of Pft=1jxg when the rational unbiased reporting hypothesis holds. Similar tohypothesis testing,
we set the rejection threshold k (which in our case is the award threshold) so that the test has a pre-specied
size. In our case, we propose a statistical screening rule of the form
ao = I

 P(  d = 1jx)  ko
	
; (16)
where ao denotes the optimal award decision and ko 2 [0;1] denotes a critical value or award threshold.
By varying the award threshold ko we can specify different award probabilities. If the SSA wanted to target





 P(  d = 1jx)  ko
	
f(x)dx; (17)
where f(x) is the distribution of the observed health characteristics in the applicant population.
We computed values of the threshold ko to match the 57% acceptance rates at the DDSstage and the 76%
ultimate award rate in the current DI award process, analyzed in Section 7. This was done by specifying an
initial guess for ko, calculating the sample analog of (17), using the empirical distribution of x in the HRS
36data, and increasing or decreasing ko until the implied award rate matched the desired award rate p (:57 or
:76 in this case).
Table 6 presents estimates of a logit specication for P(  djx) using the HRS data. We present two sets
of results, one for the full sample of applicants and non-applicants, and another for the subsample of DI
applicants used in the previous section. The results are highly signicant and generally of the expected
signs. Specically, the coefcients for diabetes, stroke, number of hospitalizations and doctor visits, and
other indicators of poor health are all positive, and are all important predictors of  d = 1 (i.e., the event that
an individual reports having a health problem preventing all work). The variables applied for DI and
proportion of months worked in the past year are the two most important predictors of disability status in
the full sample results.
Although there are far fewer observations in the applicant subsample, we feel these results are the more
relevant for this paper since it is for this subsample that we have veried the RUR hypothesis. Because we
cannot compare a non-applicant's reported value of  d with  a, we are unable to test the RUR hypothesis for
the larger sample of non-applicants. However, we have no strong a priori reason for believing that non-
applicants are any more accurate or truthful than applicants. Although non-applicants should have less of
an incentive than applicants to misreport their disability status, non-applicants are likely to be more poorly
informed about how the DI award process works, unless they are contemplating applying in the near future.
Thus, it is possible for a non-applicant's report of  d to be noisier and less accurate than that of an applicant.
Figure 5 plots the distribution of estimated probabilities Prf  d = 1jxg for different subsamples. The far
left panel of Figure 5 plots the distribution of Prf  d = 1jxg for the full sample of N = 11;098 individuals
corresponding to the left hand columns of Table 6. We see that in the full sample, most individuals have
a predicted probability of being disabled that is very close to zero. There is, however, a long thin tail
corresponding to the small number of individuals who have high predicted probabilities of being disabled.
From the leftmost column of Table 6, we see that by the most powerful predictor of being disabled,  d =1, is
the dummy variable for applying for SSDI or SSI benets. The middle panel of Figure 5 plots the predicted
probabilities of Prf  d = 1jxg for the subsample of 274 SSI and SSDI applicants for which we have complete
information on all the x variables in Table 6. We see that for this subsample, the distribution of predicted
probabilities of Prf  d = 1jxg is skewed to the right, although there is evidence of a secondary mode in the
distribution corresponding to individuals with low values of Prf  d = 1jxg. The secondary mode corresponds
to the 30% of DI applicants who are not disabled.
37Table 6: Logit Estimates Predicting Self-Reported Disability Status  d
Full Sample Applicants sample
No. Variable Estimate St. Error Estimate St. Error
1 Constant -6.15 1.17 1.53 3.03
2 Have applied 3.15 0.28  
3 Non-eligible for SSI/SSDI 0.46 0.18 -0.41 0.47
4 White -0.26 0.19 0.19 0.41
5 Vocational training 0.10 0.18 0.00 0.44
6 Bachelor Degree -0.08 0.25 0.33 0.60
7 Male 0.69 0.20 0.20 0.45
8 Married -0.18 0.55 -0.20 0.87
9 Divorced -0.33 0.59 -0.47 0.91
10 Application Age 0.03 0.016 -0.01 0.05
11 Previously applied for DI -0.44 0.68 0.47 0.55
12 No. of hospitalizations in past year 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.21
13 No. of doctor visits in past year 0.03 0.009 0.03 0.01
14 Had High Blood Pressure -0.39 0.28 0.12 0.42
15 Had Diabetes 0.23 0.30 -0.45 0.46
16 Had Cancer 0.05 0.54 0.64 0.80
17 Had Lung disease 0.01 0.33 -0.14 0.56
18 Had Coronary Problems 0.68 0.23 -0.06 0.44
20 Had Heart Surgery 0.21 0.64 -0.94 0.95
21 Previous stroke 0.71 0.86 0.29 1.07
22 Had Arthritis 0.09 0.19 -0.16 0.45
23 Back problems 0.42 0.16 -0.38 0.41
24 Feet problems 0.48 0.17 -0.07 0.43
25 Memory Test -0.09 0.03 -0.04 0.07
26 Cognitive Test -0.02 0.03 -0.07 0.08
27 Difculty jogging 0.70 0.23 1.21 0.57
28 Difculty walking across a room 1.00 0.49 0.66 0.83
29 Difculty sitting for a long time 0.29 0.18 0.25 0.46
30 Difculty getting up from a chair 0.26 0.18 0.71 0.48
31 Difculty using the stairs 0.55 0.22 0.59 0.45
32 Difculty carrying objects 0.32 0.20 -0.71 0.54
33 Difculty stooping or crouching 0.29 0.18 -0.84 0.56
34 Difculty bathing -0.14 0.58 -0.89 0.70
35 Difculty reaching objects 0.17 0.21 0.59 0.45
36 Difculty pushing objects 1.17 0.20 1.12 0.51
37 Difculty getting dressed 1.13 1.86 14.4 0.87
38 Difculty eating 1.14 1.58 -2.09 1.93
39 Difculty reading a map 0.18 0.18 -0.30 0.40
40 Current Smoker 0.39 0.18 -0.07 0.43
41 Current Drinker -0.28 0.16 -0.14 0.39
42 Mother Alive 0.03 0.04 -0.05 0.10
43 Father Alive -0.05 0.06 -0.16 0.13
44 Proportion of months worked in past year -3.71 0.41 -0.72 0.69
45 Total Family Income ($1000) in past year 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
46 Respondent's earnings ($1000) in past year -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
47 Total Hours Worked (in 100) in past year 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.04
Avg. Log L/Obs. -0.0655 11,098 -0.4852 232
38Figure 5: Distributions of Prf  d = 1jxg for Different Subsamples
The third panel of Figure 5 plots the distribution of Prf  d = 1jxg that emerges when we re-estimate the
model using only the subsample of SSI and SSDI applicants. This panel corresponds to the 232 applicants
in the second column of Table 6. This distribution is even more skewed to the right than the middle panel,
and the secondary mode in the distribution with values of Prf  d = 1jxg near zero has disappeared. We
feel this distribution is the most relevant one to use for determining the cutoff levels for Prf  d = 1jxg since
the individuals who are most likely to be aware of the SSA's denition of disability (and thus satisfy the
RUR hypothesis) are the subsample of SSI and SSDI applicants. Furthermore, as we have seen in Table 3,
the applicant population is very different from the full HRS sample. Indeed, we see signicant differences
in the logit coefcient estimates in Table 6 between the full sample and the subsample of SSI and SSDI
applicants. For these reasons, there is no reason to believe that the relationship between various x variables
and self-reported disability status  d should be the same for the applicant population and the full sample. The
signicant differences we observe in the two columns in Table 6 and in the two right hand panels of Figure
5 conrm this.
Figures 6 and 7 compares the classication errors resulting from using the optimal statistical screening
rule ao versus the SSA's actual award decision  a, for the full sample and applicant subsample, respectively.
While it might seem that by construction the optimal screening rule will necessarily outperform any other
screening rule, including the SSA's award rule, this will only be the case when the SSA's decisions are based
on the same health characteristics x that we used to construct the optimal screening rule. If the SSA has
access to more information on the applicant's health status than we were able to observe in the HRS, then
the optimal rule based on limited information will not necessarily outperform the SSA.
We calculated two thresholds ko: the rst enabled us to match the lower 57% rst stage award rate of the
39DDSs, and the second allowed us to match the higher 76% ulitmate award rate for our sample of applicants
from the HRS. We compared the classication errors from the optimal screening rule to those from SSA's
actual award decisions using the same approach as in the previous section (i.e. where we continue to assume
that  d =  t with probability 1).
Figure 6: Computerized Screening Rule: Full Sample
The top panels of Figures 6 and 7 compares the classication errors for the optimal screening rule to
classication errors of SSA's actual rst stage award decisions that are made by the DDSswhere we adjusted
the threshold ko so that the optimal screening rule resulted in an award rate of approximately pc = :56.24
The bottom part of Figures 6 and 7 compare the classication errors for the optimal screening rule to the
classication errors in SSA's ultimate award decision, i.e. allowing for the option to appeal. In this case p is
24 The actual award rate differs slightly from the pc = :57 target in Figure 6 since we had to condition on a subsample of
applicants for whom all 47 covariates had no missing values. For this subsample, the rst-stage award rate happened to be slightly
lower, 56%. We used this actual award rate as the basis for our comparison.
40set equal to the ultimate award rate :76 rather than the rst-stage award rate set by the DDS.
For both the full and restricted sample, we nd that the optimal screening rule substantially outperforms
the rststage decisions bythe DDSinterms ofclassication errors. Forexample, thetop part of Figure 6, the
optimal screening rule results in an award error rate of 17.7% compared to the actual DDS rate of 28.5%.
Similarly, the optimal screening rule results in a large reduction of the rejection error: 52.9% of those
rejected by the optimal screening rule are disabled compared to 66.7% of the DDS rejectees. The optimal
rule achieves better discrimination between disabled and non-disabled applicants, yielding arst stage award
rate for disabled applicants of 66.5% and a 32.4% rst stage award rate for non-disabled applicants. In
comparison, the DDSs appear to have great difculty distinguishing between disabled and non-disabled
applicants. The success rate for disabled applicants, 57.8%, is only slightly higher than the success rate of
non-disabled applicants, 52.1%.
In contrast, the bottom part of Figure 6 shows that the optimal screening rule does not outperform the
SSA when we use predicted probabilities  Pf  d = 1jxg based on the full sample, and where we consider the
ultimate award rate, i.e. after allowing for appeals to ALJs. Although there are still numerous discrepancies
between the SSA's award decision and the optimal screening rule, these discrepancies tend to be offsetting
so that the two procedures yield approximately the same rates of classication errors.
Figure 7 shows that the optimal screening rule does uniformly dominate the SSA's disability award
process when we compute  Pf  d = 1jxg using only data from the subsample of SSDI and SSI applicants.
Figure 7 shows that at both stages of the disability award process the optimal rule dominates the SSA's
award process in terms of award and rejection error rates. In the rst stage, the optimal rule results in a
17.7% award error rate and a 52.9% rejection error rate, which are signicantly lower than the SSA's error
rates of 28.5% and 66.7%, respectively. For the overall process, the optimal rule reduces the award error
from 25.7% to 20.6% and reduces the rejection error rate from 54.4% to 38.6%. These results seem to
suggest that the smaller, more relevant subsample of DI applicants yields a better predictor of  d than does
the full sample, even though the sample is quite small. This could be due to our conjecture that self-reported
disability is more accurately reported by DI applicants, since they presumably are more informed about the
SSA's standards for judging disability.
We conclude this section with a discussion of several caveats regarding the interpretations of these
ndings. First, there is an issue of how SSA could obtain a training sample of unbiased signals of true
disability status. One possibility would be to rely on survey results from a trusted third party, such as the
HRS,that is not associated with the SSAand can provide strong assurances of anonymity and condentiality
to motivate truthful and accurate reporting of disability status. However, a drawback of this approach is that
41due to survey time and budget constraints, the set of health characteristics x that were collected in the HRS
may only be a small subset of the set of characteristics that the SSA would like to use to make disability
determinations. To gather these data the SSA may want to consider running a large scale replication of the
Nagi study described in section 2. This would involve having teams of doctors, psychologists, vocational
rehabilitation experts etc. make independent determinations about whether a large sample of DI applicants
is truly disabled or not, recording the results of an extensive set z of medical and health measures that the
SSA is interested in using to make disability determinations. This study would then provide the relevant
training sample from which the probability of disability Pf t = 1jzg could be estimated.
Figure 7: Computerized Screening Rule: Sample of Applicants
Once this disability probability has been estimated from the training sample, subsequent disability de-
terminations can be made by having a team of suitably qualied doctors examine the applicant and record
all of the relevant z variables that SSA wishes to use to make a disability determination. We recommend
42that these variables be measured by a team of doctors who are agents of the SSA rather than continuing to
follow current practice where, in effect, the SSA relies on the z variables recorded by the applicant's doctor.
Presumably the applicant's doctor, being an agent of the applicant rather than of the SSA, could have incen-
tive to misreport the z variables in an attempt to increase the chances that their client (the applicant) will be
awarded disability benets.
We would also recommend that instead of allowing the examining team to make the disability determi-
nation, the z variables should be transmitted to SSA and it would make the determination if the predicted
probability of disability exceeds a preset acceptance threshold. The advantage of this procedure relative to
allowing the examining team to make the disability determination on the spot after their examination, is
that it reduces the possibility that empathy on the part of the examiners could affect award decisions. It
also helps to promote a more uniform application of disability award standards throughout the country. As
we noted in section 1, there are very wide unexplained state to state variations in award standards under the
status quo.
Clearly, a statistical screening rule does not obviate the need for human beings and some type of dis-
ability determination bureaucracy. We envision that a statistical screening rule would only be used as a
replacement for initial determinations at the DDS level. The appeal process would remain fully human,
allowing judgment and intangible variables to be considered rather than relying only on a predened vec-
tor z of health variables, and a mechanical implementation of the optimal screening rule. Besides allowing
hard to quantify information to be considered, an appeal would also allow the applicant to challenge the z
variables recorded by the SSA's medical examiners. If the examining team was found to have mismeasured
or misrecorded key variables, the relevant members of the team could be subjected to penalties, provid-
ing further incentive for the SSA examiners to be as accurate as possible in measuring the applicant's z
characteristics.
9 Implications for SSA's Disability Process Redesign Initiative
The problems with the DI determination process discussed in the previous sections motivated the SSA to
propose a comprehensive disability process redesign plan in 1994. The stated goal of the plan was to
simplify and streamline the sequential evaluation process used by the DDS and to improve the documenta-
tion of their reasons for denials. As part of the redesign process, the SSA considered alternative approaches
to disability evaluation using functional impairment indices which are standardized measures of health and
functional status. These would be designed to measure, as objectively as possible, an individual's ability to
43perform a baseline of occupational demands, including principal dimensions of work and task performance
such as primary physical, psychological, and cognitive processes. The goal was to provide a more consis-
tent, unied, and objective basis for initial award decisions. Other changes the SSA considered included
collapsing the current ve-stage DDS disability evaluation process into two stages, and the use of a single
disability claim manager who would be responsible for all aspects of a given claim. Under the current
system, anywhere from 16 to 26 different DDS employees handle different parts of a single DI application.
Although the main objective of the redesign initiative was to reduce delays in making disability determina-
tions, the initiative may have also been motivated by a desire to obtain a more uniform application of the
standards for judging whether or not an applicant is disabled.
Our analysis sheds light on these issues. In particular, our results suggestcontrary to the suggestions
of the GAO report discussed in section 2that the high reversal rates by the ALJs actually serves to reduce
the classication error rates. We nd that the low initial award rate at the DDS level produces a high rate
of rejection errors at this stage. The DDS centers appear to behave according to a philosophy of when in
doubt, reject. However, self-selection is operative: we nd that applicants who appeal an initial rejection
by the DDS are more likely to be truly disabled than the initial pools of applicants that the DDS evaluated.
Therefore, the relatively high acceptance rate by the ALJs, combined with the self-selection in the decision
to appeal an initial rejection, signicantly reduces the rate of rejection errors without increasing the rate of
award errors.
Regarding the larger issue of redesigning the disability award process the SSA realized that any funda-
mental change in its disability award process would require a substantial research effort combined with the
collection of new data on disabled individuals. In the mid 1990s the SSA funded contracts for the design
of a survey called the National Study of Health and Activity (NSHA) and contracted with the Committee
on National Statistics (CNS) to advise it on the design of this survey and the overall plan of research for its
disability redesign initiative. SSA recognized that unless SSA invests substantially more funds to research
and development of the simplied disability determination methodology, the full benets of the redesigned
process ::: will not be possible. (SSA, 1994).
The key element of its redesign initiative was a new approach that would focus directly, rather than
indirectly, on the applicant's functional ability to work and would rely on standardized instruments for
measuring functional capacity to reach decisions. (Wunderlich et al. 2002, p. 116). SSA's proposed
new procedure for making disability determinations bears some resemblance to the statistical screening
approach that we have described in the previous section, although the procedure that SSA envisioned did
not necessarily take the form of a formal index rule such as we have proposed.
44SSAassumed that under this proposed decision process, the majority of disability claimswould
be evaluated using a standardized approach to measure functional ability to perform substantial
gainful activity. Standardizing the approach to assessing individual functional ability would
facilitate consistent decisions regardless of the professional training of the decision makers in
the decision process. The new disability decision process, as envisioned by SSA, would assess
a person's functional ability once, relying on objective, standardized, functional assessment
instruments. SSA believed that focusing decisions on the functional consequences of a person's
medical impairments would permit physicians and others whoprovide medical evidence, aswell
as decision makers, to use a consistent frame of references for determining disability, regardless
of the diagnosis and would facilitate evidence collection by reducing the need for developing
extensive medical records. (Wunderlich et al. 2002, p. 116).
The CNS report that evaluated SSA's research plan advised that SSA should a. establish evaluative
criteria for measure the performance of the decision process; b. conduct research studies and analyses to
determine how the current processes work relative to these preestablished criteria, and c. evaluate the extent
to which change would lead to improvement. (Wunderlich et al. 2002, p. 131). We believe our study makes
signicant headway in all three of these recommendations. Unfortunately, the SSA subsequently decided to
discontinue its research on the disability redesign initiative and the NSHA survey. In part due to concerns
raised by CNS on the design of its research plan, in 1998 SSA undertook an internal reevaluation of its
disability decision process redesign initiatives. SSA concurred with several of the committee's conclusions
and some of its recommendations. However, rather than undertaking the additional research and redirection
of the research as recommended by the committee, SSA decided to no longer actively pursue the new
decision-making process proposed in Disability Redesign, but to improve the current process, focusing at
this time on updating the Listings. (Wunderlich et al. 2002, p. 123).
In September 2003, Jo Anne Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security, introduced a new set of ini-
tiatives to change the current process to determine eligibility of disability benets. The main objectives
of the new proposal are to speed up the processing times, which the Commissioner acknowledges as ex-
cessive, create accountability along the process, and expand the employment opportunities for people with
disabilities. The most radical changes suggested by the Commissioner include the elimination of the DDS
reconsideration and Appeals Board stages of the disability appeal process. These stages would be replaced
by a Federal Reviewing Ofcial who will be in charge of appeals that were previously handled by these
separate stages. The plan also establishes new expert units who are specialized in screening applications
to make quick decisions in clear-cut cases.25 The latter set of decisions will be made at the Regional Ofces
25 The elimination of the DDS reconsideration stage and the creation of the Federal Reviewing position is likely to reduce the
large state variation we discussed earlier in section 1. Notice that the Commissioner does not directly mention classication errors,
but does mention the importance of accountability and supports the creation of a centralized quality control system. More details
on the Commissioner's proposal can be found at www.ssa.gov.
45where the team of experts will be located, even before the applications are send to the DDSs. This set of
experts would include doctors in different areas of clinical specialty, including orthopedics, psychiatry, etc.
If the SSA were to record the disability determinations of these teams of experts, along with data on their
measurements of physical conditions of the applicant and various functional impairment indices, this could
be an important rst step towards collection of data for Nagi-style analysis of classication errors, and pos-
sibly the rst step towards a statistically based screening procedure similar to the one we have described in
the previous section.
10 Conclusions
This paper provides new insights into the operation of the SSA's disability award process, the large, costly
bureaucracy that constitutes the monitoring technology and chief gatekeeper determining who receives
disability benets. Partly as a result of large backlogs, long delays in providing decisions, unexplained
variation in state to state award rates, and the large number of initial denials that are reversed on appeal, the
SSA in the mid 1990s embarked on a major re-examination of its entire disability determination process,
and introduced innovative new ideas about how it might be restructured to make it faster, fairer, and more
consistent.
Unfortunately in response to critiques raised by a study of its redesign effort by the Committee of Na-
tional Statistics, the SSA has appeared to have retreated from this ambitious undertaking, and has scrapped
plans for the collection of data necessary to evaluate its existing disability award process and evaluate al-
ternative designs. Thus, we are currently in a situation where the most recent available study evaluating
the classication errors in SSA's disability award process is a study by the sociologist Nagi over 3 decades
ago. In light of the underinvestment in data collection, this study has tried to ll this gap by using data from
the Health and Retirement Study to assess the magnitude of classication errors in SSA's award process.
Although our approach of relying on a self-reported disability indicator from the HRS as a key piece of
information to assess the magnitude of classication errors is likely to be controversial, it represents the
only available means we have of making such assessments, given the government's unwillingness to invest
in the necessary research and data collection that would enable us to evaluate the DI award process via less
controversial (but undoubtedly far more expensive and time consuming) methodologies.
Although there is a substantial theoretical literature on mechanism design and the use of monitoring
technologies to solve adverse selection and moral hazard problems, the theory has few concrete implica-
tions for the design of the U.S. disability award process. In principle, it is possible to run a DI program
46without employing any monitoring technology: the SSA could simply set a sufciently low benet level
to deter most non-disabled individuals from applying. In the simplest two-type models, only those who
are truly disabled will consider applying for benets (see Diamond and Mirrlees 1978). This saves the
expense of running a DI application and appeal bureaucracy, but imposes high costs on truly disabled
individuals who receive below poverty level benets due to the informational problems in verifying their
disability status. Akerlof (1978) and Parsons (1996) showed that the SSA can achieve more efcient out-
comes (higher social welfare) if it has access to a monitoring technology, even if the signals it provides are
very noisy. However, these analyses have ignored the costs of running a monitoring technology and have not
considered the underlying problem of how best to use information from applicants in reaching accept/reject
decisions. There is also a wider unresolved question about whether disability is best viewed as a binary out-
come, or whether it is better to think of it more along a continuum, with a sliding scale of benets depending
on the level of partial disability, such as is currently done in Germany, Spain, and The Netherlands.
Our paper attempts to make some steps towards an empirical framework that could enable us to model
these complicated aspects of the disability award process. A rst step is to understand how the process really
works, and to attempt to measure its accuracy and efciency. Unfortunately, we are not at the point of being
able to provide a framework for evaluating the cost-benet trade-offs of different ways of structuring the DI
award process. We begin with a relatively limited evaluation of the accuracy of the processan examination
of its classication errors. These consist of award errors (awarding benets to a non-disabled applicant) and
rejection errors (denying benets to a disabled applicant). Our analysis is simplied by the SSA's binary
denition of disability as the inability to engage in substantial gainful activity. While the denition seems
unambiguous, the actual determination of disability on a case by case basis is a difcult process involving
many complicated, often subjective judgments about whether a specic health limitation does in fact prevent
an applicant from working altogether.
Theonly previous academic study ofthe classication errors inthe DIawardprocess was done morethan
30 years ago in the seminal study by Nagi (1969). Nagi's investigation relied on independent audits of a set
of intercepted DI applicants by teams of medical experts. It offered the closest attempt to providing formal,
objective denition of true disability. Unfortunately, this approach to program evaluation is extremely
costly and time consuming, and nobody has attempted to replicate it. In the absence of a better alternative,
we proposed a potentially controversial approach to measuring true disability, namely, we identify self-
reported disability as true disability. Specically, we use the HRS respondents' answer to the question: Do
you have a health limitation that prevents you from working entirely? (  d) as an accurate measure of their
true disability status. This puts us square in the middle of an empirical mineeld, since there have been
47many conicting empirical studies on the reliability of self-reported health measures. Some claim that such
measures are noisy, biased, and endogenous, while others nd that they are powerful, exogenous predictors
of application, appeal, and labor supply decisions.
In an earlier study (BBCCR) we used a battery of powerful empirical tests to show that  d is an unbiased
and accurate indicator of the Social Security's ultimate award decision  a. This paper builds on this result
by hypothesizing that both  a and  d are noisy but unbiased indicators of true disability  t. By making some
additional assumptions about thestochastic structure ofthese variables wehave been able touse observations
on ( a;  d) to make inferences about true disability  t, and calculate classication errors via Bayes rule. Our
calculations show that the classication errors in the existing award process are substantial: over 20% of
DI awardees are not disabled and as many as 60% of DI rejectees are disabled. We nd that these results
are robust to variations in our assumptions about the stochastic structure governing ( a;  d; t). In particular,
even though we provide strong evidence that self-reported disability is a more accurate indicator of true
disability than the SSA's award decision, the estimated classication error rates remain very large even
when we change the stochastic structure to make the SSA's award decision  a to be signicantly more highly
correlated with the true disability indicator  t than self-reported disability status  d.
Critics might claim that the reason our previous study failed to reject the RUR hypothesis is that our tests
have low power, especially given the relatively few observations of DI applicants in the HRS. However, we
showed that when we compared self-reported disability  d to a different denition of the SSA's award rate  a,
namely the initial award rate of the DDS instead of the ultimate award rate (which allows for the possibility
that initial rejections can be appealed), we showed that we can decisively reject that hypothesis that  d is an
unbiased indicator of  a. Thus, it seems unlikely that our conclusions are spurious, or result from a small
number of observations and low power tests.
Our experience with other data sets suggests that when it is possible to independently verify individuals'
survey responses, the answers are surprisingly accurate. Rust and Phelan (1997) showed that the distribution
of health care expenditures constructed from self-reported Medicare expenses in the RHS data set closely
matched the true distribution constructed for equivalent age/sex groups using the Medicare Statistical Sys-
tem. Hu et al. (1997) compared self-reported health measures to the SSA disability records using a special
data set that linked these records for a subset of SIPP participants. Our work will clearly not be the last word
on this subject, and we hope it will encourage further theoretical and empirical studies in this important area.
Although there is little more we can say to convince a skeptic that self-reported disability status is a
valid measure of true disability, we conclude by briey listing some of the insights into the operation of
the disability award process that follows from it:
481. There is a substantial amount of noise in the DI award process leading to large rates of award and
rejection errors (over 20% and 55%, respectively). The magnitude of these errors is consistent with
Nagi's ndings, although an entirely different methodology was employed.
2. While most of the analysis is carried out under the assumption that the individual self-reported dis-
ability status is the true measure of disability, we recomputed the classication errors under the as-
sumption that both the self reported disability  d and SSA's award decision  a are noisy but unbiased
indicators of true disability status  t, and obtained very similar estimates of the degree of classication
and Type I and II errors, even when we assume that the the award decision is more correlated with the
true measure than the self-reports are.
3. Much of the screening occurring in the DI award process is achieved by the individuals themselves.
We nd that there is strong evidence of self-selection in which disabled individuals are substantially
more likely than non-disabled individuals to apply for benets and appeal if denied.
4. It is difcult to estimate the magnitude and the value of the direct screening that the DI award
process provides. It begins with an applicants' pool that consists of approximately 70% disabled
and 30% non- disabled. Of the 75% of these applicants who are ultimately accepted by the SSA,
approximately 77% are disabled and 23% are non-disabled. However, it appears that the substantial
delays at various stages of the application and appeal process have strong indirect effects, serving as
type-dependent application fees that discourage non-disabled individuals from applying for benets
and appealing denials.
5. The U.S. government GAO reports suggest that much of the noise in the disability award process
results from reversals by ALJs in the appeal stage, after initial rejections by the DDS. Our results
support the opposite conclusion, namely the DDS seem to be too stringent, causing high rates of
rejection error through their willingness to err on the side of rejection. The ALJ reversals succeed in
signicantly reducing the rate of rejection errors (from 64% to 54%) without increasing the rate of
award errors.
6. We compared the performance of the disability award process to an alternative statistical screening
rule based on an estimate of the conditional probability that an individual is disabled given objectively
veriable characteristics x. The computerized rule accepts an applicant for whose predicted probabil-
ity of being disabled is sufciently high. We set this threshold so that the computerized screening rule
would yield the same award rate as is currently generated by the SSA. We found that the statistical
49screening rule substantially reduces the rate of classication errors. If we were to use our optimal
screening rule to replace the overall DI award process, we predict that for our sample, the award error
rate would fall from 26% to 21% and the rejection error rate would fall from 54% to 39%. If we use
the optimal screening rule to replace only the rst stage decision by the DDS bureaucracies (but
retaining human judges at the appeal level), the gains in accuracy at the rst stage level are even more
impressive: the optimal screening rule results in an award error rate of 17.7% (nearly 10 percentage
points less than the 28.5% award error rate of the DDSs), and an rejection error rate of 52.9% (14
percentage points lower than the rejection error rate of the DDSs). The implementation of this com-
puterized rule seems more feasible than ever with the proposed reforms to the determination process
that Commissioner Barnhart has recently presented, which advocate for the establishment of a team
of medical experts at each Regional Ofce.
We believe that this paper's principal contribution is to illustrate a simple method for analyzing clas-
sication errors that may prove useful in helping to redesign the current DI award process. The section
on statistical screening rules specically suggests the possibility that there could be more efcient ways to
process disability information. However, we are not suggesting that our computerized rule necessarily dom-
inates the current DI award process in practice. There are a number of practical obstacles to implementing
a computerized screening rule similar to the one we describe here. Applicants would have a strong incen-
tive to game the system by attempting to distort their reports of x, so as to maximize their chance of being
awarded benets. To guard against this problem, the SSAwould use its teams of medical experts who would
collect accurate measures of x for each applicant. We presume that since these experts would be paid by the
government, proper incentives can be developed to make the measure x as accurate as possible.
In any event, it seems clear that the DI award process can never be completely computerized. Human
decision makers such as expert examiners will always play a key role. In addition to the outright wage
costs of hiring these examiners, the designer of any collective decision process has to anticipate that its
expert examiners and decision makers may not always act as perfect agents in implementing its preferred
policy. This leads to a recursive problem of monitoring the monitors. The improvements in classication
error rates that we have found here represent a best-case scenario and ignore costs associated with practical
implementation of a computerized rule. In fact, it would be naive to simply substitute a computerized
screening for the current rst-stage DDS determination without a more careful modeling of applicants'
endogenous reactions to this change. In particular, if computerized screening methods signicantly reduced
delays involved in applying for benets, they could encourage a large increase in applications and change the
relative mix of disabled and non-disabled applicants. This issue is being addressed in the work we currently
50are undertaking (Ben´ tez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust 2003).
We are also currently working on estimating an empirical dynamic programming model of the joint
decision to work, retire, and apply/appeal for disability benets. This will allow us to derive individuals'
endogenously determined best replies to various policy changes including specic aspects of disability
process reforms that are currently being considered by the SSA. Although building, solving, and estimating
such models requires substantial work, we think that these more formal approaches will provide additional
insights that will be useful in improving the disability determination process in the U.S.
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